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The Untold History of Nevada’s Shield Statute 
 By 
Matthew Ward 
Dr. Stephen Bates, Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Journalism and Media Studies  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 The history of American journalism is replete with anecdotes about news 
reporters enduring jail and other penalties to protect the identities of confidential sources 
of information.  Since as early as the American Revolution journalists have often found 
themselves at odds with established authority.  In the political cauldron of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, U.S. government intrusion into the news gathering process was 
widespread.  The notion the First Amendment protected journalists from revealing 
sources was invalidated by the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.  
Many states throughout the nation reacted by codifying a reporter’s privilege.  Nevada 
did so in 1969, protecting members of the working media from having to divulge 
confidences to the government.  The statute was revised in 1975 to cover former media 
members, but the law has remained unchanged since, despite much technological 
innovation and economic changes in the media industry.  This study tells the untold story 
of Nevada’s shield statute, the 1968 news story that sparked the quiet crusade for its  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passage, and the not-so quiet efforts in 1975 to make the already strong protections even 
stronger.  It details as well a later unsuccessful attempt to modernize the law.   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 “I want to know who those felons are” (W. Lerude, personal communication, 
September 20, 2014). 
 It is to these eight words, spoken in 1968 in a not-so-unthreatening manner to 
Warren Lerude, then editor of the Reno Evening Gazette, to which one can trace the 
lineage of Nevada’s Revised Statute 49.275.  This is the state’s shield law, Nevada's 
statutory embrace of a testimonial privilege reserved for journalists.  The privilege itself 
is a social and political construct that has its roots in pre-colonial American history.  In its 
modern incarnation, though, this construct reflects a set of sometimes contradictory ideals 
uniquely representative of the American constitutional experience, with its competing 
values involving free expression and the right to publish versus the rule of law and equal 
protection.  Lerude was on the side of free expression and protecting his First 
Amendment right to gather and disseminate news in 1968.  William Raggio, the man who 
asked for the identities of “those felons,” was on the other side.  He was the law (W. 
Lerude, personal communication, September 20, 2014). 
 Raggio was then serving as the elected district attorney for Washoe County, where 
“the Biggest Little City in the World” is located.  Raggio would earn the distinction of 
being the longest serving state senator in Nevada history before he died in 2012.  In 1968, 
Raggio had been Washoe County’s top law enforcer for a decade already.  He even ran 
for the Republican nomination for U.S. senator in 1968, losing in the GOP primary 
election (Reno Evening Gazette, April 26, 1968, A1).  Raggio was in a unique position to 
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witness firsthand how the political and social fabric of both the nation and his own 
community had so drastically changed in the decade leading up to 1968. 
 The assassination of a U.S. president in broad daylight, the eruption of full-scale 
combat in Southeast Asia, bloody divisions over civil rights, the rise of anti-war and 
hippie movements and the attendant emergence of a drug culture along with them: All 
tentacles of momentous shifts in American life that impacted Reno, Nevada just as they 
did communities across the nation.  The front pages of the Reno Evening Gazette 
throughout 1968 served helpings of everything momentous—fighting the “Reds” in 
Vietnam, astronauts traveling to the moon, Bobby Kennedy’s and Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s cold-blooded slayings, the Nevada National Guard called to Korea in the wake of the 
U.S.S. Pueblo incident, and this new national scourge, drugs.  It was this last subject—
specifically marijuana use—that spurred Raggio’s demand for names from the editor of 
the local daily newspaper that year. 
 The Reno Evening Gazette had just published a story about University of Nevada 
students smoking marijuana on campus.  A photograph accompanying the story slyly 
silhouetted a group of students partaking in cannabis, hiding their identities.  As Lerude 
would later explain in a letter provided as part of testimony to the Nevada Assembly 
Judiciary Committee on March 27, 1975—and again 39 years later during an interview 
with the author—he and his newspaper were concerned with the burgeoning drug culture 
and its effects on Reno’s young people.  “We knew if the story were to truthfully inform 
the public of this problem, we would have to go to the offenders and get their views,” 
Lerude wrote to state legislators.  He continued by describing that conversation with 
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Raggio, without identifying the, by then, former district attorney.  “The district attorney 
at that time quickly reminded me that the marijuana smoking sources of ours were 
criminals, felons.”  Indeed, in 1968, possession of any amount of marijuana was 
sufficient to earn one a felony criminal charge in Nevada.  “And the district attorney told 
me he could seek out the names of those criminal/sources of ours.  And should we, as 
newspapermen, refuse to reveal our sources, we could end up in jail. 
 “The reason: Nevada had no shield law,” he wrote (Lerude, 1975). 
 The 1975 letter is only a snippet of a larger history.  Lerude’s letter does not hint 
at how he was able to get a shield law passed in the first place.  It does not reveal that 
before 1968 he was opposed to enacting a shield law in Nevada altogether.  He did not 
reveal in 1975 what he and others modeled Nevada’s statute upon or why they chose in 
1968 to keep the new shield law virtually hidden from public view by not even reporting 
its passage in their own newspapers.  The purpose of this thesis is to uncover this history 
and with it to contribute to a wider understanding of the current state of the reporter’s 
privilege, both in Nevada and throughout the nation.  Shield laws and efforts to enact 
similar legislation in Congress have been fodder for a much broader debate on First 
Amendment principles and the tension between press freedoms and the government’s 
right to collect evidence and seek justice for more than 100 years (Smith, 2013, Martin & 
Fargo, 2013, Docter, 2010, Bates, 2010, Easton, 2009, Abramowicz, 2008, Pieroni, 2008, 
Siegel, 2006, Durity, 2006, Lee, 2006, Van Gerpen, 1979, Semeta, 1960, Beatman, 1959).   
 To better establish the context in which Nevada legislators agreed to consider a 
shield law and then revise it just six years later, the following pages will highlight first 
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the long and, some would argue, sketchy history of the reporter’s privilege in America in 
general.  The following chapter will examine the attempts at various federal legislative 
efforts to protect reporters.  This thesis will examine the differences between an absolute 
versus qualified reporter’s privilege.  Also, an explication of federal and state court 
decisions regarding the privilege and state shield laws is in order, particularly since one 
of the reasons cited by advocates urging legislators to revise Nevada’s law in 1975 was 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes (1972).  That 1972 decision was 
a seminal moment in the history of the reporter’s privilege, because in a still controversial 
and widely debated 5-4 decision the court found that the First Amendment’s press clause 
contains no special protections for journalists that are not also in place for the average 
citizen (Branzburg v. Hayes, 1972).  In addition, one leg of the Branzburg case, its 
namesake in fact, involves a Kentucky reporter refusing to divulge the identities of drug-
using sources in news stories he produced when asked to do so by law enforcement 
authorities. 
 No examination of the literature surrounding the reporter’s privilege is complete 
without also describing the subject’s central conundrum.  Much scholarship has been 
dedicated to debating how state and federal reporter’s privileges, whether codified by 
statute or qualified by court precedent, define the term “reporter” or “journalist.” The 
various conflicts that have arisen as a result of legislators attempting to define these terms 
in crafting shield protections has led to much debate.  Even as Nevada crafted its own 
shield statute in 1969 this question was raised.  Defining the term “journalist” is still 
pertinent to Silver State media professionals today because Nevada’s shield statute does 
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not offer protections to digital or non-traditional journalists.  A review of the current state 
of journalism in Nevada and across the United States has shown a quick evolution toward 
digital media formats as traditional media forms diminish more and more each year 
(Mitchell, 2014, Moody’s Investor Service, 2014).  Shield laws in Nevada and many 
other states simply have not kept pace with this media evolution (Martin & Fargo, 2013, 
Robben, 2012, Durity, 2006).  In fact, the patchwork of qualified and absolute protections 
across the country is generally the reason given for urging Congress to pass a model 
federal shield.  The literature shows, however, that the 80-year-old effort to do that has in 
fact been most bedeviled by this one facet of the subject: How does one define the term 
journalist? 
 After an examination of the literature and this central issue at the privilege’s heart, 
this thesis will tell the history of the Nevada shield law, from Raggio’s demand for the 
names of “those felons” to efforts undertaken during the summer of 2014 when a 
committee created by the Nevada Attorney General’s Office examined whether the state 
should attempt to modernize the shield statute to make it more inclusive in the face of so 
much change in the media landscape since 1975.  This section will include details that 
even Lerude admits—today the 77-year-old is professor emeritus at the University of 
Nevada, Reno, where he taught media law for three decades—were never made public.  
Voices from the past will be heard again, including from Bill Farr, who served 46 days in 
jail in 1972 for declining to reveal his sources to a superior court judge.  This was the 
most lengthy recorded jail term served by a U.S. journalist for not revealing a source to 
government authorities until 2001, when a novice author served 168 days in jail for not 
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handing over her source material to federal authorities in Texas (Garcia, 2002).  Pulitzer 
Prize winning journalist Ron Einstoss, a 1955 University of Nevada graduate, testified on 
behalf of Nevada’s shield protections in 1975.  Joining him was also Reno Evening 
Gazette reporter Mark Oliva and Tad Dunbar of KOLO-TV in Reno.  Their arguments 
echoed sentiments raised during the Supreme Court’s Branzburg case, raising important 
issues about the freedom of the press, its function as a check on government authority, the 
practice of keeping confidences in order to gain the trust of important sources, all equally 
important efforts to keep the “free flow of information” unobstructed (See appendices G, 
K, and L).  It is argued that all of this is necessary to protect the public’s right to know.  A 
better informed public ideally leads to better self-governance.  Advocates for a strong 
reporter’s privilege have long argued that this is precisely the purpose of pursuing and 
protecting these lofty goals (Pracene, 2005, Van Gerpen, 1979, Whalen, 1973).   
  Finally, this thesis will address recent efforts to overhaul the Nevada shield 
statute.  The underlying philosophical arguments for modernizing the law will be 
addressed.  The pros and cons of doing such will be set out.  The finer points of whether 
the law should be made more inclusive by embracing an emerging method of thinking 
about protections for journalism over journalists will be expounded upon as well.  In the 
conclusion, this thesis will compare and contrast the three defining eras of the statute’s 
existence—passage, revision and attempted modernization—to place Nevada’s shield law 




 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Origins of a Testimonial Privilege 
 A court’s ability to obtain “every man’s evidence” is a doctrinal centerpiece of 
western jurisprudence.  The guarantee of a fair trial rests on the ability of jurists to collect 
and weigh evidence, including testimony from citizens with knowledge deemed 
important to a criminal or civil inquiry (Blackmer v. United States, 1932; Blair v. United 
States, 1919).  Often this is done through a legal instrument called a subpoena, which can 
be served on any person by legal authorities.  Subpoenas are most often served on 
witnesses called to testify before grand juries, or in civil and criminal court trials.  
Ignoring a subpoena is often punishable by a contempt of court citation, which can spell 
jail time, heavy fines, or both.   
 Exceptions to this practice of compelling and collecting witness testimony are 
few.  Common law in the U.S. originated with states adopting English rules and court 
precedents at the birth of the nation with slight modification over time (Wigmore, 1961).  
This body of law recognizes several types of privileged communications—attorney-
client, spousal, and priest-parishioner privileges to name a few.  This means an attorney 
can not be called to testify against a client, a wife against a husband and vice versa, or a 
pastor against a member of his flock.  Privileges in the common law have been extended 
before, to doctors and their patients for example, through judicial rulings or via statute, 
codified by state legislatures or in Congress.  Journalists in America have attempted since 
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pre-colonial days to persuade authorities to recognize a similar such testimonial privilege 
for their work with little success. 
 John Peter Zenger’s name is frequently invoked when discussion and debate erupt 
over the reporter’s privilege and its historical origins.  His name is listed first in a 2010 
First Amendment Center historical timeline of journalists jailed in America for refusing to 
reveal the identities of confidential sources and other information.  “John Peter Zenger, 
the German-born immigrant publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, was acquitted of 
seditious libel for his newspaper’s anonymous criticisms of New York’s Colonial Gov. 
William Cosby.  Some scholars say this trial was the first documented case in American 
history of a journalist’s defiance of a government order to reveal sources” (Belt, 2010).  
Van Gerpen (1979) similarly refers to Zenger’s 1735 arrest and trial as among the first 
instances of an American journalist being jailed for not cooperating with authorities (5).  
In his book Privileged Communication and the Press: The citizen’s right to know versus 
the law’s right to confidential news source evidence, Van Gerpen points out that most 
accounts of this historic event center around lawyer Andrew Hamilton’s masterful 
defense of Zenger, who was facing seditious libel charges and sat in jail for nine months 
awaiting trial.  It was during this jail term that Zenger was steadfast in his refusal to name 
the author of his newspaper’s critical commentary.   
 Van Gerpen cites Zenger’s case and Benjamin Franklin’s autobiography to 
illustrate an early adherence to a professional code of ethics when it came to keeping 
confidential sources critical of government (5-6).  Franklin described his own early 
confrontation with authorities: “One of the Pieces in our News-Paper, on some political 
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Point which I have now forgotten, gave Offense to the Assembly.  He (Franklin’s 
employer, a printer) was taken up, censur’d and imprison’d for a month by the Speaker’s 
Warrant, I suppose because he would not discover his Author.  I too was taken up and 
examin’d before the Council; but tho’ I did not give them any Satisfaction, they contented 
themselves with admonishing me, and dismiss’s me; considering me perhaps as an 
Apprentice who was bound to keep his Master’s Secrets” (cited in Van Gerpen, p.  6).  It 
is out of such confrontations with authorities in colonial America that an emphasis on 
freedom of the press emerged in the codified language of America’s Bill of Rights. 
Van Gerpen illustrates various clashes between the press and government 
authorities throughout his tome, providing rich anecdotal information about how 
journalists sometimes fell afoul of officialdom.  There was Simonton of the New York 
Times in 1857, jailed by the House of Representatives for an editorial criticizing lobbying 
practices in Congress (7).  In 1870, Scott Smith of the New York Evening Post wrote an 
article exposing payments to several congressmen from a faction of Cubans seeking to 
influence the vote to recognize the island republic.  Smith based his story on information 
from a confidential source.  He refused to identify his source when asked to testify and 
was threatened with losing his seat in the House press gallery (7).  In 1871, two New York 
Tribune reporters acquired a copy of the Treaty of Washington, then before the Senate for 
ratification.  The Senate wished to keep the treaty’s contents a secret.  When the reporters 
were subpoenaed to appear before a committee and name their source, they refused.  
“They rested refusal on the grounds of professional honor” (7).  In 1897, a man who told 
a reporter he witnessed a murder tried in court to claim that what he said was confidential 
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because he was talking to a reporter.  In 1911, a Georgia reporter was fined $50 for 
refusing to name a police officer who had given him information about a crime (14).  In 
1913, New York Tribune city editor George Burdick, author of a series of stories on 
customs fraud, invoked the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment protections to keep from 
being compelled to name his sources.     
Burdick v. United States (1915) was the first federal case to go to court involving 
the reporter’s privilege, though Burdick utilized Fifth Amendment arguments rather than 
a First Amendment one (Smith, pp. 16-17).  When Burdick was pardoned by President 
Woodrow Wilson, he rejected the presidential pardon and continued to maintain his Fifth 
Amendment right not to incriminate himself (Van Gerpen, 14).  In 1929, three reporters 
for the Washington Times were jailed after refusing a grand jury’s demand for the names 
of speakeasy operators who sold the newsmen liquor as part of a story they wrote.  The 
trio was sentenced to 45 days in jail for refusing to testify.  Their incarceration likely 
helped spur the first legislation introduced in Congress that same year to protect reporters 
from forced disclosure (14-15).  Only one case, from 1914, is cited whereby a reporter 
actually acquiesced to a demand to reveal his source (In re Wayne, 1914, cited by Van 
Gerpen, 1979, Sherwood, 1970).  Dozens more journalists would continue to go to jail in 
defiance of legal authorities throughout the 1900s and into the 2000s. 
 High-profile prosecutions of journalists undoubtedly led to judicial and legislative 
action, some in favor of the press, some not, often followed closely by academic 
scholarship on the subject. The literature can be divided into three distinct periods—
pre-1970s, 1970s and post-1970s.  The 1970s were both a turning point and a mid-point 
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because a new wave of political and social upheaval brought about some of the biggest 
clashes between press and government leading to calls for more state shield laws.  Before 
then scholarship regarding the reporter’s privilege was noticeably antagonistic toward the 
professional media’s attempt to invoke any sort of testimonial privilege.  In 1959, for 
example, a privilege symposium was hosted by the Connecticut Law Review.  Student 
authors researched and wrote about court-recognized testimonial privileges, including the 
attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, the priest-parishioner privilege, 
the spousal privilege and, finally, the “newsman’s” privilege (Beatman, Baum & Greene, 
1959).  The authors noted that some privileges were enshrined in state statute and others 
grounded in common law or court precedent.  One student writer cited research that 
suggested the attorney-client privilege first originated in London in 1280 (Baum, 170).  
The case of the journalist’s privilege, however, was less settled.  After all, “Dean 
Wigmore has declared that a testimonial privilege for journalists is not justifiable, and the 
American Bar Association has recommended that legislatures not enact such a 
privilege” (Beatman, 223).  The year 1959 also happened to be the year that a federal 
court first considered a case involving the privilege where the defendant attempted to use 
a First Amendment argument to withhold the identity of a source (Garland v.  Torre, 
1959).  Before then, journalists had simply invoked their professional credo of 
maintaining confidences, an English tradition that harkened back to a much earlier time. 
 Beatman was aware that by 1959 12 states had already conferred “an absolute, or 
‘blanket,’ privilege of non-disclosure of the source upon the journalist” (221).  She 
recorded her concern that these state shield laws were “excessive in scope and as 
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hampering investigation and legal proceedings” (222).  Similar musings were set forth in 
Semeta (1960).  Citing a 1930 meeting of the New York Bar Association Committee on 
State Legislation, Semeta reported how lawyers were then viewing the spate of state 
shield laws growing organically out of free press concerns in various states; nearby New 
Jersey would adopt one in 1933.  “They open the way to reckless publication and abuse, 
and while on their face they seem to protect the editor and reporter, in reality they protect 
the informant.  It seems to us that the informant, who furnishes information to a reporter 
for the express purpose of having it published, should have no such immunity as these 
bills propose” (315).  In 1959, a 15-month study of the reporter’s privilege issue was 
concluded by the American Civil Liberties Union.  A March 18, 1959 New York Times 
article announced the group’s finding that “the legislative approach in this field is neither 
necessary nor at the present time desirable,” which reflected widespread agreement 
among many in the legal profession and in academia prior to the social upheaval of the 
1960s and 1970s (317).  The 1959 ACLU report continued that “Most of the proposed or 
enacted (state shield) statutes seem dangerously loose (in their definition); none of the 
statutes has yet been tested for constitutionality, and their survival of such a test may be 
doubtful.” 
 It is no surprise that legal scholars before 1970 considered traditional media’s 
claims to a reporter’s privilege spurious at best.  The early literature is filled with 
references to John Henry Wigmore’s Treatise on Evidence, “probably the most useful and 
heavily cited law text of its day” (Northwestern University Archives online).  It is as 
ubiquitously cited as the Branzburg Supreme Court decision would be in legal 
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scholarship post 1972 regarding the reporter’s privilege.  Wigmore was a prolific scholar.  
He was dean of Northwestern University’s law school from 1901 to 1929.  During his 
tenure and after, he made several major contributions to American legal studies, including 
an oft-cited treatise on evidence that included a dissection of privileges—he did not 
support a privilege for reporters (Wigmore, 1961). 
 Wigmore’s disdain for recognizing a reporter’s privilege is well known and was 
echoed by many scholars of his time.  Sherwood (1970) cites Wigmore’s response to a 
1938 report by the American Bar Association.  “Of recent years, there have appeared on 
the statute books of several legislatures certain novel privileges .  .  .  [T]hey bear the 
marks of having been enacted at the instance of certain occupational organizations .  .  . 
The demand for these privileges seems to have been due, in part to a pride in their 
organization and a desire to give it some mark of professional status, and in part to the 
invocation of a false analogy to the long-established privileges for certain professional 
communications.  The analogies are not convincing . . . [W]e recommend against any 
further recognition of .  .  . privilege for information obtained by journalists” (Quoted by 
Sherwood, 1214).  Numerous judges over many years cited Wigmore in their decisions 
denying a reporter’s privilege.  Legal scholars before 1970 took note of these decisions.  
Beatman cited six early state court cases: Clein v. State (1951), a Florida case involving 
gambling and bribery; People ex. rel. Mooney v. Sheriff (1936), a New York gambling 
case; In re Grunow (1913), a New Jersey case involving graft by public officials; Plunkett 
v. Hamilton (1911), a Georgia case examined below; Ex parte Lawrence (1897), a 
California case about state senators taking bribes; and Ex parte Sparrow (1953), a North 
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Dakota case involving state prison conditions.  The reporter’s privilege was cited but 
failed to sway the judge in all of these cases.  The courts repeatedly invoked Wigmore’s 
treatise on evidence in deciding them as well.   
 One of the earliest and most cited state reporter’s privilege cases in the early 
academic scholarship on the subject is Plunkett v. Hamilton (1911).  The case originated 
in 1910 when a police source tipped off Augusta Herald reporter T.  J.  Hamilton about a 
murder.  The First Amendment Center’s historical timeline of jailed journalists notes: 
“Hamilton served five days in jail and was fined $50 for refusing to disclose to a police 
review board the name of an officer who had leaked information about a murder” (First 
Amendment Center online).  Georgia Superior Court Judge J. Lumpkin wrote in his 
opinion that Wigmore had laid out clear and convincing arguments for denying a 
reporter’s right to refuse to testify.  “The real point which the applicant apparently seeks 
to make is, that, by promising to keep the name of his informant a secret, he can free 
himself from the duty of testifying in a court, when called on so to do, and that 
employees can claim an exemption from testifying, because they apprehend that they will 
be discharged if they do so.  Neither one of these positions is tenable.  In 4 Wigmore on 
Evidence, § 2192, it is said: ‘For three hundred years it has now been recognized as a 
fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a 
right to every man's evidence’” (Plunkett). 
 Judge Lumpkin continued in his 1911 opinion to sketch a brief history of the 
reporter’s privilege that is valuable here.  The judge wrote that journalists and others who 
refused to identify sources to authority figures in England did so out of a sense of 
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integrity; it was a “point of honor” and it was utilized by colonists in America as well. 
“This claim of exemption from testifying .  .  .  was considered and overruled in 1776 in 
the Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 How.  St.  Tr.  586, and again in 1777 in Hill's trial, 20 
How.  St.  Tr.  1362.  Professor Wigmore states that ‘The ‘point of honor’ thus 
disappeared forever as a motive for recognizing a privilege’” (Plunkett).  Van Gerpen 
wrote that as early as 1562, English judges made no exceptions on the obligation to 
testify.  He wrote that eventually two exceptions developed, one a short-lived “point of 
honor” construct, which was invoked to protect communications between two 
“gentlemen” (63).  Lumpkin returned to Wigmore multiple times in his decision in 
Plunkett.  He quoted the much-respected professor over and over.  “In general, then, the 
mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence, or in the implied 
confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege.  This rule is not 
questioned today.  No pledge of privacy, nor oath of secrecy, can avail against demand for 
the truth in a court of justice.  .  .  Accordingly, a confidential communication to a clerk, 
to a trustee, to a commercial agency, to a banker, to a journalist, or to any other person 
not holding one of the specific relations hereafter considered, is not privileged from 
disclosure” (Plunkett). 
 Smith (2013) referred to this consistent reliance on Wigmore’s influential treatise 
by the courts when he wrote that early legal writing regarding the reporter’s privilege was 
shaped by “parochial” concerns of law school professors and legal practitioners.  “Their 
single lens for viewing the issue was the common law as they understood it: A testimonial 
privilege did not exist.” It was not until the subject moved into the constitutional realm, 
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particularly after Garland v. Torre, that “scholars began to theorize rationales based on, 
among other theories, the role of the press in a democratic society, the press as a check on 
government power, and the press as conduit for the free flow of information to the 
public.” Smith (2013), which represents perhaps the latest in-depth scholarship about the 
reporter’s privilege, argues that the weight of these contributions combined helped shape 
the “noticeable” consensus among scholars since Branzburg in favor of a privilege 
despite continued judicial divisions on the subject (43).  In other words, the 1960s and 
1970s clashes between press and authority were seismic enough to force many legal 
scholars to embrace the idea of a testimonial privilege for journalists when very few had 
ever done so previously.  
 In summary regarding the origins of the reporter’s privilege as well as the nature 
of early scholarly efforts, two trends are clear: First, many, many journalists went to jail 
rather than reveal confidential sources of information going back to pre-colonial days; 
second, before the 1970s, legal scholars almost universally disavowed any notion of a 
reporter’s privilege and even expressed concerns when state legislatures (no doubt mostly 
as reactions to journalists in their state protesting government interference for jailing 
them) dared circumvent the courts and common law by enshrining a privilege for 
journalists in statute.  Starting in 1896 with Maryland, a dozen states had statutory shield 
laws in place by 1949 (Semeta, 313).  Many members of the press endured jail and other 
government sanctions long before then, based on their professional credo and its 
inextricable links to the eighteenth century’s “point of honor” construct.  In 1934, the 
American Newspaper Guild, for example, adopted a code of ethics.  It stated in part: 
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“Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential 
information in court or before other judicial or investigating bodies .  .  .” (Sherwood, 
1203).  Today, the Society of Professional Journalists treats the subject somewhat more 
softly.  Its Code of Ethics urges caution when making promises, “but keep the promises” 
you make.  It urges journalists to identify sources in an effort to provide the public “as 
much information as possible to judge the reliability and motivations of sources.” But the 
modern code of ethics also urges reporters to “reserve anonymity for sources who may 
face danger, retribution or other harm” (Society of Professional Journalists online).  
Nowhere, however, does it urge journalists to refuse to testify in court or answer 
subpoenas from government authorities.   
Early State Shield Laws 
  The first time a state legislature enshrined a testimonial privilege for 
journalists—they were called “confidence laws” at the time—was in 1896 in Maryland.  
Eleven more legislatures passed similar laws shielding journalists over the next 50 years
—New Jersey in 1933, Alabama 1935, California 1935, Arkansas 1936, Kentucky 1936, 
Arizona 1937, Pennsylvania 1937, Indiana 1941, Ohio 1941, Montana 1943, and 
Michigan 1949.  By 1959, Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, 
and Ohio extended their protections to include radio.  Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Montana, and Ohio extended theirs to include television by then as well.  
Indiana, Montana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania also extended theirs to include protections for 
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members of press associations, a trend adopted later by Nevada (Beatman, 220, Semeta, 
313).  
 No one disputes that many of these states adopted shield laws in response to 
localized confrontations between press and government authorities.  However, the 
historical record is incomplete and many times also inaccurate.  “One problem with the 
lack of ongoing historical research is the perpetuation of small mistakes in the narrative, 
such as wrongly attributing Maryland’s 1896 shield law to the jailing of Baltimore Sun 
reporter John T.  Morris in 1886” (Smith, 32).  Smith (2013) showed that Maryland’s 
statute was likely the result of an unfolding national scandal in nearby Washington, D.C., 
not over the oft-repeated tale of Morris’ jailing.  The same can be said of the literature’s 
treatment of the first effort in Congress in 1929 to pass a federal shield.  “One would 
think that with Congress debating a federal shield law off and on for the last 80 years, 
there would be a well-developed record of the first attempt to pass such a law, in 1929.  
Yet that important event has been a footnote in the literature, and often an incorrect 
footnote at that” (Smith, 33).  Smith argued that much less attention has been paid to the 
statutory realm compared to the constitutional, which did not even begin to draw scrutiny 
until Garland v. Torre in 1959.  A body of statutory laws now exists in states across the 
country, origins of which trace back 113 years.  Historical research that might add 
valuable context to current debates remains spotty at best.  “Most noticeably absent from 
the literature is material that would shed light on the development of shield laws at the 
state level.  The little scholarship there is hints at the role that journalists, press advocates 
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and the public have played in helping to shape the direction of the law” (43).  This last 
statement could certainly apply to the story of Nevada’s shield law.   
 Nevada’s original 1969 shield law stated that “No reporter or editorial employee 
of any newspaper, periodical, press association or radio or television station may be 
required to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, 
in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation” (See Appendix A).  The law’s authors 
deemed it necessary to recount all the authoritative bodies that could not call on a 
reporter to testify: state courts, a grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury or jury officer, the 
legislature, or any legislative committee, any government department, agency or 
commission, or by any local governing body, local committee or officer thereof.  The 
shield law was amended in 1975 to include the words “or former” with regard to the 
types of journalists protected, thereby preventing authorities from waiting until a reporter 
left his or her employer before attempting to subpoena them.  The 1975 amended law also 
added the words “any note, photograph, film, tape recording or other document acquired 
or prepared by him in his professional capacity” to the shield law, while keeping the 
remainder of the original language (See Appendix F).  The shield law is broad in its 
protections by any measure.  Traditional journalists simply have blanket protection to 
shield their sources and their work product from any type of government intrusion. 
 The academic literature regarding Nevada’s shield law, however, is scant.  Like 
many of the early states that adopted such laws in the first part of the twentieth century, 
Nevada decided to enact an absolute shield privilege.  Most states today have only 
qualified statutory and court-precedent-styled protections, so any reference to Nevada is 
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usually because it is among the minority of states that offer an absolute protection.  Van 
Gerpen wrote in his 1979 book that “A reporter for the Las Vegas Sun noted that there 
was only one incident in which the court was asking for a disclosure of confidences, and 
the Nevada shield law protected those involved” (136-137).  Martin & Fargo (2013) 
mention Nevada only once, concluding that its statute is among five that “stand out for 
the brevity of their definitions of both function and format in regard to covered persons 
and organizations” (62).  Siegel (2006) called Nevada and Montana both models for 
strong, absolute reporter protections.  The research noted that “Nevada's statute protects 
journalists from having to reveal their sources, as well as published and unpublished 
information” (503).  At various times in the literature, however, Nevada is not even 
considered.  Pieroni (2008) took a detour to explain the vast differences among states 
even when their laws offered similar protections, and in a list of states having absolute 
privileges, Nevada was accidentally omitted (814).   
 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press—founded in 1970 by among 
others Earl Caldwell, one of the three reporters who made up the soon-to-be addressed 
Branzburg Supreme Court case—features only a few pithy lines about the history and 
protections of the Nevada statute: “Nevada is often recognized as having the strongest 
shield law in the country.  The law protects unpublished and published materials and 
protects the confidential sources of libel defendants” (Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press online).  There is little case law interpreting the shield law, unlike in many 
other states.  Among the few times the state’s Supreme Court has addressed the issue, the 
shield statute has maintained its integrity and served its purpose.  Most recently, in Aspen 
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v. Gentry (2013), Nevada’s Supreme Court said the statute serves to “enhance the news 
gathering process and to foster the free flow of information.”  
Absolute Versus Qualified Privilege 
  
 Before addressing the constitutional scholarship that arose out of federal case law 
starting in 1959, a brief discussion on the vagaries of absolute versus qualified privilege 
is in order.  Van Gerpen laid out nine questions to be considered when drafting a shield 
statute.  Among these are: “Who does the privilege protect? Where may the privilege be 
asserted? Absolute versus a qualified shield?” (10).  Van Gerpen admitted, however, that 
what is absolute in one place, may simply not be the case in another, though both make 
the same claims.  In 1979, it was “somewhat hazardous to attempt to classify state 
privilege statutes as conferring an absolute or qualified privilege; in several instances 
where it was assumed that the statute conferred an absolute privilege courts have held 
otherwise” (18).  Simply put, an absolute privilege is designed to protect the journalist 
“absolutely” from almost any type of interference from government authorities who seek 
to identify confidential sources of information.   
 Qualified privileges generally are the result of two situations: a state statute 
clearly spells out exceptions to the protections—for example, if the reporter should 
witness a criminal act firsthand—or the law outlines a balancing test for courts to apply.  
These balancing tests can further differentiate types of qualified privileges by allowing 
more or less protection depending upon whether information is being sought from a 
journalist in a civil versus criminal proceeding.  Whatever shield protection a state statute 
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offers, it only protects the journalist in “qualified” circumstances.  Most state statutes 
today are qualified.  In federal circuits where a privilege is recognized, they are always 
qualified.  Examples of states with qualified statutes are California, Colorado and 
Delaware.  In California the “reporter's privilege only prevents a finding of contempt for 
refusal to comply with a subpoena; consequently, it provides virtually no protection to 
reporters who are parties to the litigation .  .  .  In addition, the California Supreme Court 
has held that the privilege must be balanced against the criminal defendant's right to a fair 
trial” (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press).  In Colorado, “the law states that 
‘no newsperson shall, without such newsperson's express consent, be compelled to 
disclose, be examined concerning refusal to disclose, be subject to any legal presumption 
of any kind, or be cited, held in contempt, punished, or subjected to any sanction for 
refusing to disclose information obtained while ‘acting in the capacity of a newsperson.’ .  
.  .  The Shield Law does not apply where the news information: a) was received at a 
press conference; (b) has actually been published or broadcast through a medium of mass 
communication; (c) was based on a news person's personal observation of the 
commission of a crime if substantially similar news information cannot reasonably be 
obtained by any other means; and (d) was based on a news person's personal observation 
of the commission of a class 1, 2, or 3 felony” (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press).  In Delaware, the “statutory privilege is limited to information obtained within the 
scope of the reporter's professional activities.  ‘Professional activities’ may include social 
gatherings, but do not include instances of intentional concealment of the reporter's 
identity as a reporter, or instances wherein the reporter personally witnesses or 
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participates in acts of physical violence or property damage” (Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press). 
 Pieroni (2008) and Siegel (2006) both advocated for a federal shield law that 
offers absolute protections and shields journalists in states where similar statutes either 
don’t exist, are weak or simply outdated.  Both point out that a model federal shield law 
offers a solution to the patchwork of qualified and absolute state privilege laws offering 
varying degrees of protection across the country.  States could, of course, expand the 
protections on their own, but at least journalists could count on the consistency offered by 
a new federal shield.  Siegel used an analogy to explain the problem with many state 
shield laws and their statuses: “The inevitable disparity in treatment from case to case is 
further exacerbated by the current hodgepodge of state shield law protection.  For 
example, imagine three reporters, one of each living in the neighboring states of Georgia, 
Alabama, and Mississippi.  The Alabama reporter would enjoy absolute protection 
against compelled disclosure, the Georgia journalist would be covered by a qualified 
privilege, and the Mississippi reporter would receive no protection at all” (520).  Peironi 
argued that the states with judicially-conferred privileges presented similar problems. For 
example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota acknowledged a qualified privilege for 
confidential information in a civil case, but also recognized that “the interest of the public 
in law enforcement and the defendant in discovering exculpatory evidence” may 
outweigh the privilege in criminal cases. The Supreme Court of Vermont, conversely, 
recognized a qualified privilege in a criminal case, but it has not decided whether the 
privilege exists in civil cases (815).   
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 Peironi (2008) noted that numerous lawsuits naming journalists as well as efforts 
in Congress to enact a federal shield have continued to highlight the lack of uniformity 
across the nation.  An October 2007 report prepared by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary concurred.  It stated: “A Federal shield law is also needed because of the lack of 
uniform standards—at both the Federal level and State level—to govern when testimony 
can be sought from reporters” (815).  Peironi acknowledged also that the fast-paced 
change in the media landscape, the move from traditional news sources to digital and 
social media outlets has served to “exacerbate” the problem of inconsistent approaches all 
the more.  “The days of a reader picking up a newspaper from the front porch and reading 
a daily digest of news collected by local reporters from local sources is rapidly coming to 
an end.  When it does, applying the distinctly local law of a reader's jurisdiction to a 
reporter's work in another state, collected from sources in a third state, will cease to make 
much sense.” (816) 
 While the media landscape changes rapidly, including in Nevada, legal 
protections for journalists clearly remain problematic in some jurisdictions.  Up until now 
this review of literature has examined the origins of a testimonial privilege, the early 
adherence by some states to create their own statutory privileges outside of the judicial 
setting, and the difference between qualified and absolute protections.  Now let us shift to 
the constitutional debate and the hefty scholarship defining that topic.  This piece of the 
privilege puzzle concerns scholars the most because a clear answer on whether the First 
Amendment provides shield protection remains elusive even 42 years after Branzburg. 
!24
A Constitutional Question: Pre-Branzburg 
 In the annals of reporter’s privilege literature, scholars agree a turning point of 
sorts occurred in 1958, setting the stage for later constitutional squabbles in federal courts 
over whether the First Amendment’s press clause provides for a right to gather news, and 
thus a right to protect confidential sources from disclosure.  What had long been a 
common law dispute was about to turn into a First Amendment crusade.  The case was 
Garland v. Torre (Smith, 2013, Bates, 2010, Fargo, 2003, Van Gerpen, 1979).  Marie 
Torre was a New York Herald Tribune gossip columnist.  She reported a confidential 
source telling her that famed actress Judy Garland thought herself “terribly fat,” and 
refused to continue a project with CBS.  Garland filed a lawsuit against CBS for 
$1,393,000 for defamation and breach of contract.  But Garland’s attorneys needed 
Torre’s source in order to make their case.  Torre said at the time she believed “no judge 
in the land would ask a reporter to name a news source” (quoted in Bates, 97). 
 Torre’s attorneys argued that the First Amendment as well as common law 
allowed the columnist to keep her confidences protected.  The judge in Torre’s case, 
Potter Stewart, however, ruled she could not claim a testimonial privilege.  “He accepted 
the hypothesis that forced disclosure might entail an encroachment on press freedom, but 
reasoned that since freedom of the press is not absolute, the question to be determined 
was ‘whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the 
present case justifies some impairment of the First Amendment freedom’” (Van Gerpen, 
88).  Torre was eventually found guilty of contempt for refusing to name the source and 
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she was sentenced to 10 days in jail, suspended pending appeal (Bates, 105-106).  Torre’s 
refusal to identify her source, Stewart found, harmed Garland’s ability to make her claim 
(Garland v. Torre).   
 Bates argued that the court introduced a sort of First Amendment balancing test 
that would be invoked by federal courts in future cases.  It also seemed it was easier for 
the appellate court, particularly since Torre was regarded as a mere gossip columnist—
she received little support from newspaper colleagues—to rule she had no constitutional 
privilege to withhold the name of her source, especially since the information she 
withheld was both material and relevant to Garland’s defamation claim.  But, Judge 
Stewart did allude to a potential situation where limits to a reporter’s obligation to testify 
could be reached, especially in situations where prior restraint to publication or some 
wholesale compulsory forced disclosure foisted upon journalists became an issue (Bates, 
109).  The Supreme Court refused to hear Torre’s appeal and New York’s legislature as a 
result sought passage of a shield law for reporters afterward.  Congress also saw bills 
introduced based on the outcome of Garland v. Torre, particularly since Torre’s jail term 
incensed many of her fans (Bates, 112-113).   
 Scholars agree Garland was a turning point.  But another case, this one a state 
court decision, may have sparked a much wider legal debate, even, according to Smith, 
leading to the creation of several state shield laws.  This case was State v. Buchanan 
(1966), an Oregon case featuring a fight between press and government authority that, 
like Paul Branzburg’s ordeal a few year later, involved reporting on drug abuse from the 
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perspective of unidentified drug users.  This tale shares a kinship with the origins of 
Nevada’s shield statute. 
 Annette Buchanan was a senior at the University of Oregon when she was named 
managing editor of the student newspaper, the Oregon Daily Emerald.  On May 22, 1966, 
during a coffee run, Buchanan was approached by several students who were concerned 
with the lack of balance in several Emerald stories about the spread of drug use on 
American college campuses (Smith, 159).  “They suggested that the Emerald was anti-
marijuana and that we wouldn’t print the other side of the story, even if we could get 
it” (quoted in Smith, 160).  A few days later, the Emerald printed an article under the 
headline “Students Condone Marijuana Use.”  An editor’s note revealed that “For 
obvious reasons, the names used here are not actually those of the students 
interviewed” (quoted in Smith, 160).  Statements from students interviewed for the piece 
included opinions about the hazards of marijuana use. Some students said pot was not the 
same as harder drugs. Also expressed was the opinion that people using marijuana are 
generally less irresponsible than people under the influence of alcohol.  One statement in 
particular caught the eye of the local district attorney.  A student told the Emerald that he 
knew at least 200 people who regularly smoked marijuana. 
 Coincidentally, the Emerald, in an editorial published a day before Buchanan’s 
story ran, endorsed Lane County district attorney William F. Frye’s opponent for election 
to the state legislature.  Frye was an avid reader of the Emerald; he had also attended the 
university and worked as a reporter and editor there before graduating in 1956 (Smith, 
158).  After reading Buchanan’s story, he consulted with Eugene’s police chief.  By June 
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3, Buchanan was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury empaneled by Frye 
specifically to investigate the Emerald’s pot story.  Having fretted over what she would 
say all night, the frazzled “girl editor” showed up to the grand jury room and was 
confronted by seven jurors and Frye.  Asked if she would tell the jurors the names of any 
of the students she interviewed for her story, Buchanan refused, saying, “No, I will 
not” (quoted in Smith, 163). 
 Frye immediately went to a nearby judge’s chambers and requested a court order 
to compel disclosure, but Buchanan’s attorney successfully argued for a delay in the 
proceedings.  “I’m not through with you yet,” Frye told the young college editor.  By 
June 13, the plight of the Emerald’s managing editor was national news.  Reporters 
flocked to Eugene not just to cover the unfolding drama, but to support Buchanan.  Many 
even testified on her behalf, arguing that she not only had a First Amendment right to 
protect her sources, she had a professional obligation to do so.  Frye, for his part, argued 
that there was nothing in Oregon’s law providing a testimonial shield for reporters.  
“There is no common law, there is no historic right which makes it possible for a 
journalist to define under oath to testify” (quoted in Smith, 164). 
 Buchanan’s attorney argued that Frye had issued his subpoena in bad faith—the 
subpoena was characterized as retribution for the editorial endorsing Frye’s opponent; 
Frye had lost in the primary election.  This argument did not sway the judge, however.  
“It will be the order of the court that this witness answer each of the questions put to 
her” (quoted in Smith, 164).  Buchanan was brought back to the grand jury two days later 
and again refused to testify.  A contempt charge was filed and she was ordered to appear 
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back before the judge.  Leading up to the contempt trial, Buchanan was buoyed by an 
outpouring of support.  Frye took the unusual step of responding to this by penning letters 
to the editor in multiple newspapers, explaining that “Sound law enforcement depends 
upon the willingness of every citizen who has knowledge of criminal activity to come 
forward and to testify if necessary.” Buchanan was held in contempt of court, but spared 
jail time.  She was fined $300.   
 The college editor’s attorney announced he would appeal the ruling, citing as one 
reason the fact no journalist in Oregon history had ever been held in contempt of court.  
Press advocates worried the ruling would embolden prosecutors across the state.  Days 
after, a lobbying effort began in earnest to shape an Oregon state shield law.  Newspapers 
and wire services from across the country covered the verdict, employing multiple 
rhetorical devices, Smith wrote, in order to sway public opinion and place First 
Amendment arguments in the forefront, just as occurred eight years earlier in Garland 
(168).  Smith wrote that in calling for a state shield law, one editorial, published in the 
Oregonian, framed the argument in terms that would be made popular a decade later by 
noted constitutional scholar Vincent Blasi.  “In a democratic society, the free press is the 
watchdog for the public and no such regime has long endured where this was not 
so” (cited in Smith, 173). 
 The Oregon Supreme Court heard arguments in Buchanan’s appeal in December 
1967.  Less than eight weeks later it issued its judgment: “Nothing in the state or federal 
constitution compels the courts, in the absence of a statute, to recognize such a 
privilege” (quoted in Smith, 175).  The seven-member supreme court went to great 
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lengths to explain its decision, taking up both sides of the argument, the winning side 
noting arguments similar to those that would be expressed in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision four years later in Branzburg.  Smith thoroughly documents the uncanny 
resemblance between the state supreme court’s decision in Buchanan and Justice White’s 
majority opinion in Branzburg.   
 It was after Buchanan that legal scholars began seriously examining the 
constitutional arguments for and against a testimonial privilege for journalists, building 
toward Branzburg in 1972 when the debate reached a crescendo.  It should be noted that 
the decision in Buchanan coincides to the very year the Reno Evening Gazette decided to 
investigate pot smoking on the University of Nevada campus, the same year its editor, 
Warren Lerude, would also be threatened with jail if he didn’t turn over the “names of 
those felons.”  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Branzburg Decision 
  
 Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) involves arguably one of the oddest rulings ever made 
by the U.S.  Supreme Court concerning press freedoms.  Its impact on the reporter’s 
privilege debate is unquestionable; it sparked an avalanche of legal and media studies 
scholarship.  It remains the only time in U.S. history that the nation’s highest court has 
addressed the question of whether the First Amendment provides a testimonial privilege 
for journalists.  Berger (2003) noted that almost 100 federal shield statutes were proposed 
within six years of the Branzburg decision (1391).  Lee (2006) interpreted the decision in 
Branzburg as holding that journalists share “coextensive” constitutional protections with 
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the public, rejecting a testimonial privilege for reporters under the First Amendment and 
making news gathering an incidental, an even tangential issue (643-645).  Easton (2009) 
called the Branzburg decision “devastating” to media professionals and the most 
influential decision on news gathering ever made by the Supreme Court (1294). 
 Branzburg was a conglomeration of four federal appellate cases involving three 
journalists, Paul Branzburg, Earl Caldwell and Paul Pappas.  The case’s namesake was an 
investigative journalist for the Louisville Courier-Journal who in 1969, at age 27, earned 
the ire of local authorities by publicizing drug use and drug manufacturing in his 
community, but refused to divulge the identities of confidential sources who provided 
first-hand accounts of engaging in the illegal activity.  Branzburg held a law degree from 
Harvard University and a masters degree from Columbia University’s journalism school.  
He investigated the abuse of narcotics among many other subjects (Easton, 1301).  In 
November 1969, the Courier-Journal ran a story about two “hippies” making hashish out 
of marijuana.  The hippies’ identities were withheld by the newspaper.  A Jefferson 
County, Kentucky grand jury subpoenaed Branzburg, who promptly invoked the state’s 
shield law, which protects the “source of any information procured or obtained by him 
(journalist), and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station 
by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected” (cited in Easton, 
1301).  Branzburg’s attorney also cited the First Amendment and the state constitution in 
arguing for a temporary restraining order from the state appeals court.  The argument did 
not work in the end, though a temporary restraining order was granted.  “Even before the 
revised opinion was issued, Branzburg had published two more controversial stories 
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based on observations and interviews with Kentucky drug users,” setting up a second 
criminal case against the young reporter (1302).  Kentucky’s shield law was ruled 
inapplicable by the state appeals court because the court ruled the statute only protected 
“sources.”  It did not apply to the reporter’s personal observations of criminal activity 
(Easton, 1319).  Branzburg’s petition for review by the United States Supreme Court was 
granted on May 3, 1971.   
 Earl Caldwell became disillusioned by racism in the insurance industry before 
becoming a reporter for The Progress in Clearfield, Pennsylvania.  That job eventually 
landed Caldwell at the New York Times in 1967, where he wrote about race issues 
(Easton, 1295).  He developed confidential relationships with several members of the 
Black Panthers in Oakland and San Francisco.  This brought about the scrutiny of federal 
authorities—a month of phone calls from the FBI seeking his assistance eventually turned 
into three subpoenas seeking his work product and orders to testify before a federal grand 
jury (1299).  Caldwell kept appealing the subpoenas and orders to testify to the Ninth 
Circuit Court.  The circuit court vacated a lower court contempt ruling against Caldwell 
in November 1970.  The court ruled the public’s First Amendment right to be informed 
would be jeopardized by forcing a reporter to testify before a grand jury in secret.  The 
federal government petitioned for Supreme Court certiorari and it was granted on May 
3, 1971 (1300).  
 Paul Pappas was a television reporter and photographer for WTEV-TV in New 
Bedford, Massachusetts, working out of the station's office in East Providence, Rhode 
Island.  On July 30, 1970, he covered a Black Panther leader’s speech.  He stayed after 
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the speech for an extended period at the Panthers’ local headquarters.  Pappas was 
summoned to appear before a Bristol County grand jury two months later.  He claimed a 
First Amendment privilege to decline to answer any questions about what he saw or any 
communications he may have had at Panther headquarters that night.  When he was 
directed to appear before the grand jury again, he filed a motion to quash on First 
Amendment grounds because he feared “that any future possibilities of obtaining 
information to be used in my work would be definitely jeopardized, inasmuch as I 
wouldn't be trusted or couldn't gain anyone's confidence to acquire any information in 
reporting the news as it is” (1303).  Pappas’ motion was denied by a judge, who noted 
Massachusetts did not have a shield law.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on 
January 29, 1971 refused to follow arguments on Pappas’ behalf, many of which centered 
around points also made in the Caldwell case.  The court ruled that to follow Caldwell—
who won an unprecedented qualified privilege in the Ninth Circuit—would be akin to 
judicial legislating.  Petition for certiorari to the U.S.  Supreme Court was granted on 
May 3, 1971.  Oral arguments were made on February 22, 1972 for Caldwell and the next 
day for Pappas and Branzburg. 
 On June 29, 1972, the Court issued its decision, with Justice Byron R. White 
writing the majority opinion.  The Ninth Circuit decision in Caldwell was reversed, while 
the court upheld the lower court rulings in Branzburg and Pappas.  Chief Justice Burger 
along with justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined White’s opinion.  Justice 
Powell, however, wrote a controversial concurring opinion that would later be cited by 
multiple circuit courts that eventually fashioned their own qualified privileges.  Justice 
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Douglas and Justice Stewart wrote dissenting opinions, with justices Brennan and 
Marshall joining Stewart.  The following quotation perhaps best illustrates Justice 
White’s majority opinion: 
 We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's welfare.  
 Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without  
 some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.  But these  
 cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the  
 press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to  
 withhold.  No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal,  
 related to the content of published material is at issue here.  The use of confidential sources by the  
 press is not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means  
 within the law.  No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or  
 indiscriminately to disclose them on request (White in Branzburg, 681-682). 
Lee (2006) noted that in addition to their disagreement about the constitutional 
significance of news gathering, “Justices White and Stewart offered starkly differing 
views of the role of the press in society” (646).  To Justice White, a special, 
constitutionally mandated position belonged to the grand jury, not the press.  “If a 
journalist's privilege were to be created, Justice White observed, this was a task for 
Congress or state legislatures” (651).   
 In dissent, Justice Stewart called the majority opinion a “crabbed view of the First 
Amendment,” saying the decision “reflects a disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of 
an independent press in our society” (Branzburg).  
  The question whether a reporter has a constitutional right to a confidential relationship  
 with his source is of first impression here, but the principles that should guide our decision 
 are as basic as any to be found in the Constitution.  While MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S enigmatic  
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 concurring opinion gives some hope of a more flexible view in the future, the Court in these  
 cases holds that a newsman has no First Amendment right to protect his sources when called  
 before a grand jury.  The Court thus invites state and federal authorities to undermine the historic  
 independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative  
 arm of government.  Not only will this decision impair performance of the press’ constitutionally  
 protected functions, but it will, I am convinced, in the long run harm rather than help the 
 administration of justice (Stewart in Branzburg, 725). 
  
Powell’s “enigmatic” concurring opinion was indeed an odd turn of events.  Martin & 
Fargo 2013 as well as many other scholars have noted that Powell’s argument created a 
doorway for lower circuit courts to entertain the possibility of a qualified reporter’s 
privilege.  “Through the few cases in which the appellate circuits have dealt directly with 
the issue, a loose definition of ‘privileged journalist’ has emerged” (50).  In Powell’s 
opinion the news gathering process was not “unprotected” by the First Amendment.  “If a 
newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith 
he is not without remedy.  Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information 
bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he 
has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source 
relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the 
court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered” (Powell 
in Branzburg). 
 Docter (2010) also reported that numerous lower courts fashioned qualified 
privileges in the aftermath of Branzburg.  The Tenth Circuit did so five years later in 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (1977).  The Second Circuit did so in in von Bulow v. von 
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Bulow (1987).  The First, Third, Ninth and Eleventh circuits all followed suit (Docter, 
591, citing Alonzo, 2005; Durity, 2006; In re Special Proceedings, 2004, In re Madden, 
1998; Shoen v. Shoen, 1993; United States v.  Caporale, 1987).  Siegel (2006), by 
contrast, chose to focus attention on the circuits that refused to acknowledge a privilege, 
even interpreting the same Branzburg decision to deny the existence of one.  Siegel noted 
that the First Circuit appeared to reverse course In re Special Proceedings, a 2004 
decision involving Jim Taricani, a Providence, Rhode Island television reporter who 
broadcast evidence being presented to a grand jury conducting a corruption probe.  
Taricani refused to tell prosecutors how he obtained the taped evidence, which was under 
a protective order, and he was placed on house arrest for six months (In re Special 
Proceedings, 2004).  The D.C.  Circuit also refused to recognize a privilege in the 2005 
Valerie Plame affair that ensnared New York Times reporter Judith Miller and Time 
Magazine’s Matt Cooper.  Miller went to jail for nearly three months for refusing to name 
her source.  The Seventh Circuit in McKevitt v.  Pallasch (2003) also cited Branzburg in 
dismissing the invocation of a reporter’s privilege (Siegel, 494-495).  Numerous scholars 
would later cite these developments as justification for a federal shield law, arguing that, 
just like the hodgepodge of protections offered by many state laws, federal circuits now 
represented a jumble of inconsistency as well. 
Life (and Scholarship) After Branzburg 
  As noted earlier, in the six years immediately following the Branzburg 
decision, federal shield laws were proposed 100 times.  The number of states passing 
!36
some form of shield  statute also increased as a result of the decision—today every state 
has some semblance of a statutory or judicially created protection save perhaps Wyoming 
(Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press).  A noticeable shift, however, has taken 
place since 1972 with regard to the literature.  The closer to Branzburg one gets, the more 
one sees a concentration by scholars on adjudging how states can best write and pass 
statutes that acknowledge a reporter’s privilege.  Van Gerpen (1979) is one good example 
of this.  Van Gerpen exerted considerable effort to outline how one could construct a 
workable shield law—choosing qualified versus absolute; defining protected persons, 
proceedings covered, materials protected, the circumstances in which a person can be 
denied the privilege and other steps (142).  The central question Van Gerpen identified is 
the definition of protected person: Does the statute define the news person’s relationship 
to their employer? Is “news media” defined at all? Are degrees of protection offered 
based on the type of media dissemination? Is the status of former journalists defined? Van 
Gerpen broke down the three criteria best used to describe how disseminators of 
information are related to formal media: “1.) They use a noun such as ‘reporter’ or 
‘cameraman.’ This can help exclude freelancers.  2.) They use the term ‘employed by.’ 3.) 
They list the functions of the reporter, such as ‘newsgathering’” (143).  This structural 
method for crafting a shield law appears in many state statutes, including Nevada’s. 
 The further one moves away from Branzburg, however, a shift in the literature 
becomes evident.  Scholars slowly embraced what many have come to believe is a 
solution to the age-old question at the heart of the reporter’s privilege debate: Just who is 
a journalist?  In the years after Branzburg, scholars such as Van Gerpen sought out 
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structural methods for defining professional reporters so that only a certain group could 
attain protection, while others, such as anarchists working for a counterculture 
publication, or Black Panthers producing film of clashes with police, would not be 
defined as protected persons.  This “structural” method, however, has proven so divisive 
that many scholars note that the failure to pass a federal shield law—Justice White 
invited Congress to do so in his Branzburg opinion—is directly the result of disagreement 
over who counts as a “real” journalist deserving protection and who does not.  Smith 
(2013), Martin & Fargo (2013), Pieroni (2008), Siegel (2006), and others argued that for 
a federal shield to work it must be based not on the structural definitions of covered 
persons and covered media like those embraced in the 1970s, but on a more “functional” 
definition, where the practice of journalism is protected, not the practitioner based on his 
or her employment status. 
 The advent of Internet publishing as well as the rise of citizen journalism have 
been major drivers of this trend.  Each represents emerging forms of journalism often 
unprotected by older shield laws.  Model legislation introduced in Congress fails to 
address this issue as well.  Pieroni (2008) noted the central problem with recent proposed 
federal shield statutes sought separately by Congress and the Media Law Resource Center 
was they each “endorsed a definition of ‘journalist’ that favors the big players in the 
industry, rather than protecting journalism as a process” (819).  Ambramowicz (2008) 
drew a similar conclusion.  Ambramowicz argued that courts should adopt a flexible, 
procedural approach to determining the weight given to a reporter’s request to invoke the 
testimonial privilege.  Did the reporter follow industry guidelines in promising and 
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keeping confidentiality?  Is the benefit to the public interest, on a case-by-case basis, in 
keeping the source confidential evident and supportive of maintaining the privilege?  
These are questions  Ambramowicz believes courts should weigh.  Durity (2006) agreed, 
arguing that bloggers are left out even as the news media shifts further and further away 
from traditional platforms to increasingly digital methods of disseminating information to 
the public.  Citing the First Circuit’s decision in Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp. (1998), 
Durity agreed with the court, which held that “the medium an individual uses to provide 
his investigative reporting to the public does not make a dispositive difference in the 
degree of protection accorded to his work.” The court held that as long as the reporter’s 
intent was to disseminate information to the public at the outset of the news gathering 
process, then protection can be afforded.  “These holdings support the theory that 
bloggers acting as journalists should not be excluded from protection under the reporter’s 
privilege merely because they have selected to use an online-posting format or are not 
members of a traditional media outlet” (10).  And yet, almost all except the latest state 
shield statutes leave bloggers and other types of digital journalists unprotected; this 
includes Nevada’s statute.  Durity noted that fighting subpoenas is expensive and time 
consuming for almost any media operation.  Subpoenas threaten to chill independent 
journalists or those specialists who fall outside traditional reporter definitions.  “The 
increasing use of the Internet by journalists to distribute information and by the public to 
receive information makes this ambiguity all the more worrisome” (13). 
 As shall be seen shortly, all of these issues arose in the course of Nevada’s efforts 
to pass and then amend its state shield law.  The question of who shall be covered by the 
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law was an important one for both legislators and news professionals.  The debate 
surrounding revisions to the law in 1975 were imbued with the very First Amendment 
arguments that first surfaced in Garland v. Torre, in State v. Buchanan and later in 
Branzburg.  And of course, the same concerns that have pushed scholars to focus more on 
“functional” aspects of defining protected persons in the law rather than antiquated 
“structural methods” led to consideration in 2014 of revisiting Nevada’s shield law.                                                           
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CHAPTER 3 
NEVADA’S FIRST SHIELD LAW 
From Purist to Pragmatist 
 The front pages of the Reno Evening Gazette throughout 1968 screamed the social 
and political upheaval that was gripping Nevada and the nation.  On the second day of 
that year, a page one headline informed Reno residents that 14 of its citizens had been 
arrested on marijuana charges (REG, Jan. 2, 1968, A1).  Three days later, news hit the 
streets that local brothel owner Joe Conforte had been acquitted of “white slavery” 
charges (REG, Jan. 5, 1968, A1).  By the end of the month, Washoe County District 
Attorney Bill Raggio, who would announce his candidacy for the Republican nomination 
for U.S. senator later that year, spoke about the dangers of marijuana and the substance’s 
contribution to local crime (REG, Jan. 31, 1968, A1).  The Gazette noted the DA’s 
observations that criminals use the illicit weed to fortify their criminal courage, that its 
use lowers inhibitions, and that chronic users are eventually completely demoralized by 
its effects.  A February 1, 1968 front page story noted that “Juvenile Narcotics Cases Go 
Way Up in Washoe.” By the following month, the Gazette’s Mimi LaPlante wrote about 
posing as a Reno High School student for stories about the state of the city’s youth. 
 While the big news was mostly local at the beginning of 1968, the pace of 
national and world events accelerated.  By the end of March, President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson announced he would not seek a second term.  In April, the nation was shocked 
when civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. was gunned down in Memphis, leading to 
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widespread rioting that also captured the nation’s attention.  The shock and despair over 
King’s murder had barely subsided when Robert F.  Kennedy, the leading candidate to 
replace Johnson as president, was slaughtered inside a hotel kitchen in June after winning 
the California state primary.  His death brought back memories of his brother, President 
John F.  Kennedy, himself struck down in Dallas by an assassin’s bullet five years earlier.  
The catastrophic war in Vietnam also made daily headlines; more than 400,000 had 
already been killed in the war, announced one front page story.  Hanoi bombing runs and 
Paris peace talks joined presidential politics in dominating news as well.   
 Warren Lerude was a reporter for the Associated Press when he decided to apply 
for a reporter position open at the Gazette in 1963.  In 1967, Lerude was elevated to the 
role of managing editor, virtually running the newspaper’s newsroom.  By the end of 
1968, the young editor would be scrambling to defuse a threatening showdown with the 
local district attorney over a news story: A tip that pot was being smoked on campus led 
him to assign a reporter and photographer to get to the bottom of it.  It was big news to 
him and to the community.  The university, after all, was a beer-drinking school (Lerude, 
2014). 
 Lerude told this author almost a half-century later that he always had considered 
himself a First Amendment purist—a devout believer that the Constitution’s free press 
clause protected his ability to gather and disseminate news.  State shield laws, he 
believed, forced journalists into potentially compromising positions vis a vis state 
legislatures (Lerude, 2014).  Because politics is often measured by give and take, he 
believed journalists should not ask lawmakers for favors.  By the end of 1968, however, 
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the new editor was contemplating a mad dash to get a state shield law pushed through the 
upcoming 1969 state legislature.  Lerude said reality had forced his transformation from 
purist to pragmatist.   
 The district attorney, Bill Raggio, had taken notice of the story about pot-smoking 
college kids on the University of Nevada campus.  Lerude remembered a photo 
accompanied the story; it silhouetted the students, who were not identified.  Raggio told 
Lerude he wanted the identities “of those felons” captured in the photo.  Lerude said he 
refused the DA’s request, telling Raggio in no uncertain terms that “those felons” 
happened to be the children of the same people who elected him to office.  Raggio told 
the editor that a local district court judge might not agree with those sentiments.  He 
further told Lerude that he and his reporters could face jail for refusing to identify the 
paper’s sources for the story.  
 Indeed, unlike today, where multiple states, including Nevada, have legalized the 
use of marijuana for medicinal purposes—Colorado and Washington legalized 
recreational pot use in 2014—and where metropolitan and rural areas alike are awash in 
street drugs of all sorts, drug abuse in 1968 was itself newsworthy.  The use of illegal 
drugs was a national phenomenon.  Actor Cary Grant’s LSD trips made the March 21 
front page of the Gazette.  In the September  18 issue, a story ran on the second page 
under the headline: “University No Sanctuary For Drug Users: Dean.” A slammer 
headline across the top of the front page in the October 4 Gazette quoted a local drug 
counselor: “Some young drug users are beyond my help.” The October 18 issue carried a 
story on A1 about John Lennon’s arrest in London on drug possession charges.  The 
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November  6 issue carried a story on its front page reporting that 75 percent of narcotics 
cases prosecuted by Raggio’s office were eventually dropped.  Stories of drug use were as 
ubiquitous on the front pages of Reno’s evening newspaper in 1968 as were tales of 
Vietnam skirmishes, political assassinations, hippies and protest marches. 
 Lerude did not like the thought of jail—or of revealing the names of college kids, 
who really could face felony-level criminal penalties at the time for possessing any 
amount of cannabis.  After the threat from Raggio, Lerude contacted the California 
Newspaper Publishers Association in Sacramento for help.  He sought to quickly copy 
California’s state shield statute and have someone quietly introduce a bill during the 1969 
Nevada State Legislature.  Luckily, he had a fellow newsman in State Sen. Warren L. 
“Snowy” Monroe, a Democrat from Elko who served in the state senate from 1958 until 
1976.   
 Monroe was not just a politician, he was also publisher of the Elko Independent, a 
newspaper he bought after graduating from the University of Nevada in 1929 (Las Vegas 
Review-Journal, April 3, 1987, online archive).  Monroe was nicknamed “Snowy” 
because of his white hair.  He was a long-serving figure in state politics, having first won 
election to the Nevada Assembly in 1940.  He won reelection in 1942, but World War II 
forced him to leave his seat the following year.  Monroe returned to the lower house in 
1946 and was elected to the Nevada Senate in 1958.  The senator died in 1987, one day 
after announcing in his “Hot Copy” column in the Independent that he had contracted 
pneumonia.  In 1969, “Snowy” Monroe’s help was sought in getting a state shield law 
introduced, getting it passed, and doing it all with as little fanfare as possible.  Lerude did 
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not like asking for favors from legislators, first, and he believed publicity could hinder 
passage of a bill as well. 
For The Record 
 According to its official legislative history, Senate Bill 299 was introduced by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on February 28, 1969.  Monroe was chairman of that 
committee.  The official history notes that the bill originated as bill draft request 4-1630 
(See Appendix B, Senate History, 55th Session, p. 102).  When the Senate Judiciary 
Committee took up SB299 on March 4, Monroe called it the “Shield Bill.”  Russ 
McDonald, a legislative counsel, explained “there were several like bills, California, 
Kansas, and several other states have it.  This stresses the Right of Free Press rather than 
the theory of confidential relationship” (See Appendix C).  Monroe stated the law would 
aid the press in “digging out information.”  The minutes record a senator saying the 
language of the original was “too broad” regarding who would earn the protection.  
McDonald said he would change the language.  The minutes record that “Senator Young 
felt the newspapers kept a lot people honest as they didn’t want to be publicly known 
they weren’t.  He respects the powers of the press” (Appendix C).   
 McDonald promised to review the bill’s language—particularly with regard to 
covered persons—and was to get back to the committee.  On March 7, the body 
reconvened and Monroe remarked that McDonald had fixed the “employed by” language, 
advising that “this would cover the publisher, editor, reporter or other employees of the 
newspaper.”  The bill was passed out of committee.  By design, according to Lerude, the 
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committee was also taking up SB290 at the same time.  That bill required a demand for 
retraction in instances of libel or slander.  Lerude said both bills were introduced at the 
same time on purpose; both mimicked existing California law.   
 The libel bill was introduced to replace an antiquated “right of reply” law on the 
books that most legislators did not even know existed (Lerude, 2014).  Lerude believed 
both bills were risky endeavors—the politicians could seize upon the right of reply law 
and use it as a tool against the media and could also refuse to enact a shield law, thus 
officially depriving journalists of an important tool for investigative reporting (Lerude, 
2014).  According to the March 31, 1969 Assembly Judiciary Committee minutes, Reno 
Evening Gazette reporter Vicki Nash was at this meeting—she was covering the new libel 
bill, not the shield statute (Lerude, 2014).  However, she managed to comment for the 
record on SB299, according to the meeting minutes. “The trend today is to train reporters 
to have positive statements based on fact and then there will be no grounds for trouble.  
Our newspapers and wire services have fits if you quote ‘undisclosed sources,’” she told 
the committee (See Appendix E).  It should be noted that among the few to comment 
regarding SB299 was future U.S.  Senate majority leader Harry Reid, who in 1969 was a 
young state assemblyman.  The minutes note he said of the proposal: “This bill has 
merit.”  Fellow legislator Torvinen, however, beyond expressing a concern over the broad 
protection being offered by the bill’s language, voiced another worry: “This kind of 
legislation encourages sloppy reporting.  Just say an undisclosed source.  If you are a 
public figure you don’t have a cause of action anyway” (See Appendix E).   
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 This sparsely populated record confirms Lerude’s assertions that the shield law 
was set to pass quietly.  No mention of Raggio’s threats or the Gazette’s news item about 
pot-smoking college kids are to be found in any of the state records related to SB299.  It 
would no doubt have been scandalous if the real reason a shield law was being sought 
was to protect the identities of kids smoking pot at the University of Nevada.  The bill 
was successfully ushered through the state legislature, passing the senate 18-2 (Journal of 
the Senate, 1969, p. 338) and the assembly 30-4. Torvinen was among the nays, with six 
others absent (Journal of the Assembly, 1969, p. 798). The bill was delivered to the 
governor on April 14.  Despite the success, a Saturday morning phone call to Lerude 
nearly derailed the effort (Lerude, 2014). 
 Governor Paul Laxalt was in the midst of signing legislation when he came across 
SB299.  He must have known the bill originated somehow with Lerude.  The governor 
perhaps even knew the whole story, though it is unclear if that is the case.  Lerude 
recalled the morning phone call.  He said the governor told him the bill would not be 
signed.  Lerude could not recall why Laxalt was against the bill, but he remembered 
making a forceful case for it that morning over the telephone: “We have to have this,” 
Lerude recalled telling the governor (Lerude, 2014).  Finally, the governor relented, 
saying he would sign the bill against his better judgment.  Lerude pulled it off.  Nevada 
had a shield law, and an absolute one at that.   
 Laxalt left the governor’s mansion in 1971.  He would serve two terms as a U.S.  
senator.  In 1975, Lerude returned to the state legislature to push for revisions to the 
shield statute.  Unlike in 1969, Lerude arranged for a coterie of journalists to testify.  
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Publicity also attended the bill’s introduction, with newspapers around the state printing 
editorials in favor of a revised law.  It was also during legislative hearings in 1975 on the 
matter that Lerude briefly hinted at the origins of the state’s shield law for the first time in 
public (See Appendix K).  Lerude said he arranged for legislators to hear firsthand from 
reporters who had been jailed and whose work created legal entanglements for 
themselves (Lerude, 2014).  Among the journalists who testified on behalf of revising 
Nevada’s statute was a California journalist who at the time held the record for the most 
days spent in jail by a reporter for refusing to identify a confidential source.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 MAKING A CASE FOR REVISION 
The Branzburg Decision Spurs Action 
 Assemblyman Steve Coulter introduced AB381 in the 58th session of the Nevada 
Assembly in the spring of 1975.  A former TV journalist and university instructor, Coulter 
would serve four terms in the state Assembly.  He would later spend 20 years with Pacific 
Bell in San Francisco, retiring as a vice president at the company (Tahoe Daily Tribune, 
May 9, 2006, online).  In 1975, Coulter was the point person for guiding a revised shield 
bill through the state legislature.  He urged his fellow legislators to pass the revision, 
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Branzburg.  Coulter was 
first to speak when the Assembly Judiciary Committee convened on March 27.  Reading 
from a prepared statement, he said, “Up until June of 1972, there would have been little 
need for … something called a shield law.  Until then, the First Amendment to the 
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press was generally considered inviolate” (See 
Appendix H). 
 Coulter was joined by eight others, mostly journalists, who advocated AB381’s 
passage.  Joining the assemblyman were Lerude, Dean Smith of the Reno Newspapers, 
Inc., Karen McDaniels of Sigma Delta Chi, John Huether, Reno Newspapers, Mark E.  
Oliva, Reno Newspapers, Bill Farr, of the Los Angeles Times, Ron Einstoss from the 
Visalia Times-Delta, and Tad Dunbar of KOLO-TV.  Coulter began by passing around his 
legislation and told the committee that he had heard from many journalists around the 
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state who supported the bill (See Appendix H).  He also commented that news people are 
sometimes the only link between politicians and the public.  One initial question Coulter 
was asked by the committee was why a former newsperson needed protection.  Farr and 
his experience earning the distinction of being the American journalist to serve more jail 
time than any for refusing to divulge a source’s identity was the answer.  Farr, whose 
record was broken in 2001, served 46 days in jail in 1972; as a reporter he was shielded 
by California law, but once he left the newspaper, he was not.  According to the minutes, 
Lerude spoke next.  He started by suggesting that reporters rely on confidential sources of 
information on which to base stories and that if those sources could not be protected, they 
would dry up.  He then gave examples, including a prepared statement, which will be 
explored later.  Lerude also passed out to the committee a booklet titled “Freedom of the 
Press—the Threats and the Washington Post.”  Lerude noted that seven states had so far 
passed shield laws, though there were more than that on the books.  He also said the 
shield was not so much a privilege as it was a protection of the public’s right to know 
(See Appendix H). 
 Mark Oliva, a reporter with the Reno Evening Gazette and Nevada State Journal, 
spoke next, followed by Farr.  Farr told the committee of his numerous confrontations 
with authorities during his coverage of the Charles Manson trial.   Farr told the committee 
that AB381 closed loopholes and that reporters should not face jail for simply doing their 
job.   Ron Einstoss, who was managing editor of the Visalia Times-Delta at the time, was 
instrumental in bringing Farr up to testify.  Einstoss was also an alumnus of the 
University of Nevada’s journalism school.  He was a member of a team of Los Angeles 
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Times reporters awarded a Pulitzer Prize for coverage of the 1966 Watts riots.  Einstoss 
was also Farr’s successor at the Times.  Tad Dunbar, a newsman for KOLO-TV, also 
spoke.  Dunbar said he wanted to provide the committee the television reporter’s 
perspective.  He said a revised shield law was not just needed to protect the “high-level, 
national attention-getting” stories, but that the protection is necessary for smaller, local 
newsmen as well.  He said the broader the bill the better (See Appendix H).  The 
Assembly committee meeting minutes do not reflect any other testimony.  However, 
attached to the minutes are multiple written statements that reveal even deeper feelings 
about the need for a revised statute.     
 Coulter’s written statement opened with a statement about how the public is 
concerned with honesty in government (See Appendix J).  He wrote that without reporters 
doing their jobs, perhaps more politicians would be more concerned with conducting 
their own business instead of the public’s.  “And no one would probably ever know” (See 
Appendix J).  “Throughout much of this nation’s history, the news media has been 
exposing wrongdoing in government, labor and business.  The exposure that results often 
leads to criminal prosecutions or reforms to prevent future abuses.  But the source of this 
information is often the disgruntled employee who passes on information—confidentially
—to journalists.  If the source feels the journalist might be forced to reveal his sources, he 
won’t talk.  Certainly on occasion the press has abused its authority.  But overall, I think 
it has served the country well,” he wrote (See Appendix J).   
 Coulter’s letter reiterates his feeling that had it not been for the decision in 
Branzburg, there would be little need for a state shield law.  “Then the U.S.  Supreme 
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Court, in a 5-4 vote, did its own editing job on the First Amendment and ruled that a 
newsman had no right to refuse to reveal his confidential sources to a grand jury.  But at 
the same time, the high court virtually invited Congress to enact newsmen’s shield 
legislation.  Congress is still debating the question, but over half the states have taken up 
the challenge.  Nevada has been one of them, he wrote.  Coulter argued that the current 
law in Nevada was similar to other states’.  He said the changes he proposed were similar 
to what California did to “meet obvious shortcomings in the law.” He wrote that AB381 
proposes two major changes: 1.) Extend protection to former newsmen.  2.) Protect the 
newsman’s tools, such as notes, photos, tape recordings and similar items.  “To force a 
reporter to reveal his notes from an interview is often about the same thing as forcing him 
to name his source,” he wrote. 
 Coulter shared some responses to his effort from newsmen around the state.  Cal 
Sunderland, editor of the Humboldt Sun in Winnemucca, wrote, “ Your AB381 bill to 
amend Nevada’s shield law has my wholehearted support and I trust the legislature will 
enact it without delay.” The Nevada State Journal published an editorial in support: 
“Such strengthening is important to newsmen and public alike.  The mere act of resigning 
from a news position should certainly not strip former newsmen of their shield rights for 
stories covered by newsmen.  And photographs, films and tape recordings are often as 
much a part of the reporter’s trade as his notebooks.” The editorial also stated, “The law 
is vital to the public because newsmen are frequently the only window on hidden or illicit 
people and situations.  It’s a window that could be shut on the public if shield laws do not 
remain strong.”  A.D.  Hopkins Jr., a former investigative reporter with the Las Vegas 
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Review-Journal, was managing editor of the Valley Times in North Las Vegas in 1975.  
He wrote to Coulter about the potential issues faced by former Las Vegas journalists: 
“The need  … is great in Las Vegas because of the large number of newsmen who enter 
other businesses, such as hotel public relations, and who may then be subject to 
subpoenas, perhaps politically inspired subpoenas.  It should be noted that in a state as 
small as Nevada, with small circulation newspapers, even cub reporters may handle 
blockbuster stories.” John Howe, KOLO-TV news director, is recorded in Coulter’s 
written statement saying, “Often, when the public needs protection (as from its own 
government) the best sources are often afraid to be identified.  If such people think the 
reporter is legally unable to protect them, they won’t talk.” Coulter also shared a portion 
of a Review-Journal editorial, which stated, “This kind of law is essential so the public 
can read accurate, in-depth articles about sensitive topics.  Newsmen often are the only 
link the public has with situations that politicians wish would remain hidden.  Newsmen 
must be protected from vindictive officials or juries.  And photographs, tape recordings 
and films must be kept confidential, all in the line of protecting sources who provide so 
many inside stories.” The editorial continued, “In order to gather news, reporters must 
feel they won’t be harassed later by grand juries and courts.  Even when they quit news 
jobs, their shield rights should remain with them.  We urge passage of AB381 for all the 
people.” 
 Lerude also submitted a written statement (See Appendix K).  He introduced it 
with a description of a recent story that relied on confidential sources—a right-to-work 
state initiative—that could have serious implications for Nevada.  “So, there you have the 
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need for Assembly Bill 381—the reporters either get certain kinds of information on a  
confidential basis or the public doesn’t get the news.  Confidentiality is, simply put, a 
working tool of the news reporter and the news source who, together, get information to 
the public.”  Lerude then listed a series of other news stories that depended upon 
confidential sources.  A Reno councilman’s firm obtained $40,000 in real estate 
commission from vice figure Joe Conforte in a controversial land deal, for instance.  The 
City of Reno planned secret negotiations with airlines on landing fees, already among the 
lowest in the United States, was the focus of another. There were also news stories 
involving serious problems with a highway overpass under construction in Reno.  Also, 
“alien movements” toward Las Vegas and their connection with Mafia activities were the 
focus of other stories that utilized confidential sources. Stories about Reno’s city 
government being unable to account for thousands of dollars in parking tickets and pieces 
highlighting the lack of security at the Nevada State Hospital were also mentioned as 
being impossible news items without the assistance of confidential sources.  “These 
major stories are but a few of the thousands printed by newspapermen in the state as a 
result of confidential sources coming forward with information.  These stories can be 
obtained only by an independent press,” Lerude wrote.   
 Lerude’s written statement also cited the Watergate scandal and subsequent 
resignation of President Nixon as an example of potential threats to press independence.  
“But imagine for one moment the disruption in that public service—journalism—if 
President Nixon and/or the Committee to Re-elect the President had been successful in 
obtaining the notes and background information being used by the probing reporters of 
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the Washington Post.  All the President’s men could have stayed one step ahead of the 
pursuing reporters and the coverup might never have been uncovered.”  Buried deep in 
his written statement, Lerude then relayed the unknown history of the original Nevada 
shield law.  The Reno Evening Gazette had grappled with how to expose drug use among 
younger people to the public.  Young people were smoking pot and then some were 
getting into heavier drugs, such as speed, heroin and LSD.  The newspaper interviewed 
all the stakeholders in the community, Lerude wrote, including legal, medical and 
education professionals as well as parents and young people.  “Including pot smokers, 
who told us their story on a confidential basis.” He wrote that he knew that if the story 
were to be the most truthful “we would have to go to the offenders and get their views.” 
“The district attorney at that time quickly reminded me that the marijuana smoking 
sources of ours were criminals, felons.  And the district attorney told me he could seek 
out the names of those criminal/sources of ours.  And should we, as newspapermen, 
refuse to reveal our sources, we could end up in jail.” Without mentioning the role he 
played in helping get the original shield bill introduced, Lerude also quoted Sen. Warren 
“Snowy” Monroe.  “This makes it possible for newspaper people to obtain information 
more readily and under the protection that they don’t have to place their sources in 
jeopardy.” 
 Oliva provided the committee with a written statement as well (See Appendix M).  
“In passing Nevada Revised Statute 49.275 as it now exists, the state legislature affirmed 
its belief that the public is entitled to an unimpeded flow of information,” he wrote.  He 
argued in his statement that a shield law that protects a journalist from providing 
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compelled testimony, but still allows police or prosecutors to rifle through his files in 
search of information, “isn’t much of a shield law at all.” Oliva also argued that the press 
acts as a buffer between officials and the public and that “to keep channels open” a strong 
shield law was necessary.  The reporter also urged lawmakers to view the shield law’s 
protections as not conveying a special privilege upon the press, but as a needed protection 
of the public’s right to be informed.  “God help us if we ever pass laws to protect the 
press or any other special interest group,” he wrote.  Oliva told legislators that during his 
12-year career, he’d been subpoenaed nine times—seven before trial courts and twice by 
grand juries.  In his written statement, he listed a number of stories he has written that he 
could only complete with the help of confidential sources.  Among these were a 1961 
story that exposed postal bribery attempts by the aide of a Wisconsin governor.  In 1970 
he was able to demonstrate that the developer of a controversial land project had given 
money to three county supervisors, one of whom was later indicted.  In 1971 he 
demonstrated how a grand juror had used a phony investigative report to convince other 
grand jurors that an upstanding public official was guilty of dereliction of duty.  In 1974 
he pieced together a fraud orchestrated in Switzerland and the Bahamas that was selling 
worthless desert land to duped European investors.  “More recently and more specifically, 
in Nevada, I was able to tell how members of the Santo Trafficante organized crime 
family are attempting to set up a cocaine distribution system in the Las Vegas area, and 
how initial attempts are being made to infiltrate the Culinary Workers Union,” he wrote. 
 Einstoss also provided a written statement to lawmakers (See Appendix L).  He 
wrote that prior to joining this newspaper, he spent more than 10 years covering the Los 
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Angeles County criminal courts, district attorney’s office and grand jury for the Los 
Angeles Times.  A University of Nevada, Reno alumnus, Einstoss made a number of 
similar arguments for revising Nevada’s shield law as other witnesses.  “The right of 
confidentiality,” he wrote, “cannot be denied to the unpublished portion of a reporter’s 
notes or the unused portion of a cameraman’s film without violating the basis of 
confidentiality which underlies Nevada’s existing shield law.” He noted to legislators a 
common practice among journalists, of promising confidentiality in order to gain 
information and insight, even if not all of the information makes its way into a news 
story.  “When a source of information is not able to feel that his trust in the reporter is 
complete, there can only be a chilling effect on the flow of vital information to the 
public.”  Einstoss also told lawmakers that he did not know how journalists could 
maintain confidential sources if the state’s shield law didn’t also protect a reporter’s notes 
and work product, unless the journalist simply destroyed the information after use, which 
would deprive him of important reference material for future articles.  Einstoss also made 
an argument for how smaller newspapers can be most negatively affected when reporters 
find themselves engaged in court battles with authorities.  “Fighting these threats can 
jeopardize the economic health of small newspapers—like the Times-Delta and many of 
those you have in Nevada,” he wrote.  If a lengthy legal “donnybrook” awaits the pursuit 
of certain stories, then legislators can bet no small newspaper will risk its financial 
survival to pursue them, he wrote.  “Just as you, legislators, must retain the confidence of 
your constituents, newspapers—large and small—must keep the confidence of their 
readers.” 
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 The Nevada Assembly Judiciary Committee passed AB381 with minor 
amendments on April 9, 1975 (See Appendix H).  A second reading of the bill was done 
on April 14.  A roll call vote commenced and the bill passed out of the Assembly 27 yeas 
to seven nays.  Two legislators were absent and four did not cast votes.  The bill was 
introduced in the Senate on April 17.  The next day it moved to the Committee on 
Judiciary.   
 The Senate Judiciary Committee met on May 1.  The meeting minutes show that, 
“Assemblyman Steve Coulter appeared on behalf of this bill.  He informed the 
Committee that this will (sic) extends the newsmen’s shield law to former newsmen for 
stories they were involved in before the law was in effect and it will also cover the 
newsman’s tools, such as notes, tape recordings, photographs, etc” (See Appendix I).  
Coulter told the committee of the Assembly Judiciary Committee’s extensive hearings on 
the revised law.  The Senate committee immediately passed the bill with little discussion.  
The bill was read a second time in the full Senate on the same day and ordered for third 
reading.  On May 2, the bill was read for third time, with remarks by Sen. Warren 
Monroe and another senator.  A roll call vote was held.  The bill passed 17-1, with two 
senators absent (64).  On the 106th day of the 58th Nevada Legislature, AB381 returned 
to the Assembly after passage in the Senate.  It was formally passed on May 7, 1975.  It 
was signed by the governor shortly thereafter.   
 The law sits on the books unchanged after almost four decades, unchallenged in 
the courts, but dusty and antiquated compared to efforts in other states where legislators 
have updated their statutes to reflect a much different media landscape than existed just 
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after Branzburg.   Nevada policymakers flirted briefly with modernization in 2014, to no 
avail. 
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CHAPTER 5  
AN ATTEMPT AT MODERNIZATION 
A Road Less Travelled  
 Like many public policies on the books across the country, Nevada’s shield law is 
more representative of a bygone era.  It is antiquated and in need of reform, if merely to 
reconfirm the state’s commitment to a free and independent press, and to update the 
statute’s protections to include more modern forms of information dissemination.   
 Scholarly work regarding the reporter’s privilege always appears alongside major 
events involving the news media.  In the 1970s, the U.S.  Supreme Court’s decision in 
Branzburg led to an avalanche of legal scholars studying the meaning of the decision as 
well as its consequences.  Then in the mid-2000s, particularly with the jailing of New 
York Times reporter Judith Miller, another spate of high-level thinking surrounding the 
reporter’s privilege took place.  And in this latter era, scholars came to believe that 
previous work on the subject was all wrong—many have now concluded that a misguided 
adherence to defining protections based on the employment status of journalists, where 
traditional big media trump all, has actually hindered efforts to formulate a national 
policy.  This has repeatedly been the case for 80 years.  Durity (2006), Ugland & 
Henderson (2007), Docter (2010), Robben (2012), Martin & Fargo (2013), and Smith 
(2013) are all examples from the literature that reflect this growing sentiment among 
legal scholars.  All embraced the idea that many state statutes are simply outdated and in 
need of revision to reflect a more modern media landscape. 
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 Nevada policymakers are not ignorant of this trend.  In April 2014, a 
subcommittee of the Nevada Attorney General’s Technological Crime Advisory Board 
examined updating the Nevada shield law in order to make it more inclusive for online-
only media professionals as well as updating the law’s language, bringing it in line with 
recommendations by such groups as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (See 
Appendix O).  The goal of the project was to deliver to legislators a revised version of the 
state’s shield law that did what modern legal scholars agree should be done—enact 
language that protects journalism as a function, instead of protecting traditional structures 
at the peril of journalists working outside traditional media.  This next installment of 
shield law history, unfortunately, may turn out to be just a footnote. 
 The Technical Privacy Subcommittee was formed on Sept. 5, 2013.  Nevada 
Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto named her appointments to the committee on 
Oct. 18.  The mission of this group was to make recommendations as well as monitor 
changes in international, federal, and state policy and legislation involving privacy 
protections.  The group also was to serve as advisors relating to technology in Nevada, 
including how medical, financial, location, and communication data were being utilized 
(See Appendix N).  The members of this group were University of Nevada Las Vegas 
computer science professor Hal Berghel, chair of the group; Stephen Bates, a University 
of Nevada Las Vegas journalism professor; Dennis Cobb, consultant and former deputy 
chief of the Las Vegas Metro Police Department; James Earl, Cyber Counsel for the State 
of Nevada; James Elste, CEO of Cognitive Extension, Inc.; Allen Lichtenstein, then 
general counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada; and Ira Victor, a 
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digital forensic examiner at Data Clone Labs.  Bates and Lichtenstein collaborated on the 
proposal to refashion Nevada’s shield law.   
  
New Language for a New Era 
 According to the April 17, 2014 meeting minutes of the privacy subgroup, Bates 
and Lichtenstein had already made some headway in crafting new language for a revised 
shield statute.  However, it also appeared the pair had already encountered some push 
back, even if only slight at that point.  “There is kind of a ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t break it’ 
feeling,” Lichtenstein remarked during the meeting (See Appendix O).  Member Elste is 
recorded in the minutes as showing the proposed revised shield law to an Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) representative.  They called the language one of the more 
“rock solid” laws that they had seen.  Elste also shared that the EFF consultant approved 
of the more functional language in the proposed revisions: “One of probably the most 
important pieces of feedback and one that I think will bear some discussion for our group 
is that they look at the type of information that is covered and who does that apply to.  
From EFF’s perspective, it is the functional definition of journalism that’s more important 
than a status definition of journalism.  I believe what we have in the current language, is 
you have to be a certain type of journalist to be covered as opposed to looking strictly 
speaking at the act of journalism” (See Appendix O).   
 Elste described the language in Nevada’s current shield law as a “series of labels,” 
dictating protection for certain people.  Upon hearing how some state statutes do not 
!62
provide protections for book authors—recall in 2001 author Vanessa Leggett surpassed 
the record set by Bill Farr in 1972 for number of days spent in jail for refusing to divulge 
a source’s identity—Elste said he understood the conceptual rationale for Nevada to 
revise its statute.  “I think that one really resonated for me because an unpublished author 
who is doing investigative journalism or producing a book that is using investigative 
techniques may well need the same sort of protection,” he said.  The group adjourned the 
meeting with an agreement that Bates would rework the language in the revision and also 
provide the group with some examples of successful, if not more modern, shield statutes 
on the books in other states. 
 The privacy subcommittee next met on May 30.  Another version of a revised 
Nevada statute was handed out (See Appendices Q and R).  Bates opened the discussion 
by reminding the group that a functional approach was being made in the wording, 
“rather than an employment-based approach” (See Appendix P).  He also mentioned 
adding language that would penalize abuse of process by authorities who may leverage 
legal costs in order to force compliance.  Also, language was proposed that would require 
notice be served on journalists prior to law enforcement serving subpoenas on a reporter’s 
phone records or other third-party information.  The group discussed a 2010 National 
Security Agency whistleblower case, the Thomas Drake affair.  Drake leaked sensitive 
information about the NSA’s domestic spying to a Baltimore Sun reporter.  After the brief 
detour, the subcommittee members discussed whether a revised shield statute would be 
ready by Sept.  2, when the attorney general would need to send her office’s bill draft 
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requests to the legislature.  Berghel wondered aloud if “this shield law is potentially ready 
for prime time.”  
 From the audience, Barry Smith, president of the Nevada Press Association, 
chimed in on the discussion.  Far from Lerude’s passion in 1968, Smith informed the 
group that his clients—the state’s newspaper industry—were “nervous to be touching the 
Shield Law at all” (See Appendix P).  “I’m contradicting myself (Smith basically agreed 
with the group’s conceptual analysis) and I would advise them that this is (the) way we 
ought to be going but I’m just telling you that I won’t have a unanimous response to 
that,” he warned the group.  Berghel asked Smith what he thought the group should do to 
assuage the industry’s fears.  “We are, after all, trying to do this for the journalists in the 
state,” the chair said.   
 Smith explained how the law already covers the majority of members of the 
state’s press association.  Since they were already covered, most would not want to risk 
the protections already available to them, he warned.  Berghel finally asked: “Barry, are 
you more nervous about touching the statute than you are about the substance of the 
draft?” “Yes, definitely,” Smith answered.  Berghel confided that he saw Smith’s point: 
“OK, that’s an important consideration because once the legislature decides to deal with 
something, they can decide that (they) don’t believe in shield laws and just revoke the 
whole thing.”  The conversation continued among the group.  Earl said he believed that if 
the issue were recast as economic opportunity for the state to attract bloggers who enjoy 
the protections of Nevada’s better shield protections, then legislators would be more apt 
to listen.  Elste said he would reject language penalizing process abuse and simply stick 
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with First Amendment arguments.  Responding to Smith, Elste said the proposed revised 
shield statute goes far in advancing journalism in the state.  “It would be a shame not to 
have the press association shoulder to shoulder with us at the table,” he said. 
 The Industry Balks 
 The May draft of Bates and Lichtenstein’s revised shield law was approved by 
vote of the privacy subcommittee to be taken up by the next meeting of the attorney 
general’s Technological Crime Advisory Board.  That meeting occurred on June 5 (See 
Appendix S).  Berghel opened the discussion by explaining the issues to the board.  
“Modern journalism is no longer restricted to the traditional journalistic employers,” he 
told the board.  He also cited the Branzburg decision and said that without a federal 
shield law, “It’s left to the states to protect journalism .  .  .  We propose that the already 
excellent Nevada statute be further enhanced.”  Berghel went on to explain the functional 
approach to the language: “It’s worded in such a way that we don’t have to be technology 
focused because by the time we get the new statute passed, the technology will have 
changed again.  We’ve endeavored in this proposed statute revision to expand the 
coverage on the basis of the function of the journalist not the particular manner or means 
by which they apply their journalistic skills.”  James Owens, a Las Vegas Metro Police 
deputy chief, asked whether a blogger or anyone who posts online, would be shielded and 
Berghel answered, perhaps too hastily, in the affirmative.  Owens quickly said he could 
not support any legislation that allowed that.  The press association’s Smith was then 
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asked his opinion, and he dutifully repeated that 90 percent of his association’s 
membership was already covered by the existing law and so “our point of view is that we 
are kind of hesitant to touch it.”  
 After considering the shield law revisions as well as a number of other privacy 
and technology related issues, the board’s chairwoman, Attorney General Masto, 
described her feelings about the board dealing with proposed legislation.  She believed 
that legislators on the board who believed strongly in a proposal should take up those 
causes on their own.  Traditionally, she said, “if they are interested in moving forward 
with any legislation or any issue that comes before this Board, they usually will handle it 
and move it forward at their own direction and discretion.”  The shield law revisions as 
well as two other items—proposed legislation to include a privacy rights clause in 
Nevada’s constitution and a proposal asking Nevada’s congressional delegation to 
support better online privacy rights under federal law—were put on hold.  Law 
enforcement concerns and lackluster support from the Nevada Press Association appear 
to have played an outsized role in this outcome.   
 When the privacy subcommittee next met on Aug. 29, the members were 
disappointed that three of their four recommendations to the Technological Crime 
Advisory Board had been abandoned (See Appendix T).   Elste told the other members 
that he was concerned that the subcommittee had spent the better part of a year on 
proposals and had pulled together a group with expertise in the field.  The minutes record 
him stating that with three of the proposals tabled, he was worried that the group may feel 
their efforts were not appreciated and their time better spent elsewhere.The group then 
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entered into a long discussion into its statutory duties and whether it should even be 
associated with the technological crime board.  Other subjects were addressed, and the 
new shield law the group had worked so diligently on faded from conversation.  
Modernization would have to wait.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
A Profound Policy Statement 
 “No reporter or editorial employee of any newspaper, periodical, press association 
or radio or television station may be required to disclose the source of any information 
procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation.”  
This is a profound policy statement, crafted and ushered through the Nevada state 
legislature in 1969 with little fanfare and no publicity.  The telling of the history behind 
this particular policy has never been done before, and according to one recently published 
study, Smith (2013), such histories are noticeably absent from the privilege literature, 
including over the span of the entire 113-year existence of state efforts to enact shield 
statutes (43).  Smith called this material important in order to shed light on the 
development of such statutory policy.  “The little scholarship there is hints at the role that 
journalists, press advocates and the public have played in helping to shape the direction 
of the law” (43).  Smith and others have advocated the types of statutory shield laws that 
advance First Amendment values, just as Nevada’s clearly does.  Smith concluded that 
statutory law should be placed in an elevated role, “not merely as a second-best work-
around, but as a valuable outlet for the people to express what their Constitution means to 
them.” 
 For Lerude, he was a First Amendment purist up until 1968; his deep-rooted belief 
was that the Constitution protected his ability to gather news without government 
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interference.  When that appeared untenable, he did what Smith predicts has happened in 
many state legislatures—he took it upon himself, with the help of others, to shape public 
policy in a way that enshrined his belief in the importance of an independent press to the 
proper functioning of a democratic society.   Of course, public input on this policy 
statement was non-existent in 1969, which does raise questions about whether the lack of 
transparency in the process jibes with any assertion that fundamental democratic values 
were at play.    
 The lack of transparency in 1969 was certainly made up for in 1975. Repeatedly 
throughout their testimony in that year, Lerude, Oliva, Einstoss, Farr and others invoked 
traditional First Amendment principles—the free flow of information, the public’s right to 
be informed, self-governance, the press’ checking function—to buttress their arguments.  
They also cited the inability of Congress to pass its own shield law, and, of course, the 
decision in Branzburg, which left many states scrambling to pass shield statutes in 
response.  It certainly weighed heavily in Assemblyman Coulter’s rationale for revising 
the Nevada shield law.  It was the 1970s, as well, with Watergate intrigues mixing with 
Church Committee revelations and Rockefeller Commission horrors, all lifting the veil on 
American political machinations that bore slight resemblance to the America most people 
thought they knew, loved and understood.  The strengthening of Nevada’s shield law, one 
could argue, is reflective, perhaps reactive, to the shocking state of affairs that marked the 
1960s and 1970s.  This time it unquestionably was an open and honest exercise in 
democratic processes. 
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 But what a difference 39 years makes.   In 2014, when a small group, representing 
academia, the business community and law enforcement met to propose a more modern, 
more fair revised shield statute, the effort was stymied from the start, and startlingly by 
the very industry the group sought to protect.  The Nevada Press Association essentially 
reported that while most of its membership is covered by Nevada’s already strong shield 
statute, the industry would be loathe to tinker with what is not broken.  That thinking, 
perhaps, is sadly a missed opportunity to prepare the foundations today for the practice of 
journalism tomorrow.  It is also patently unfair to the men and woman who perform the 
same functions as television and newspaper reporters but do so for an online audience, 
through blogs and podcasts.  Asked what he thought about including bloggers in 
protections extended to traditional media outlets, Lerude said, “Of course bloggers should 
be protected.”  But, alas, they are not.  It is as if Nevada’s shield law has come full circle, 
marked by an opaque process in the beginning, revised vibrantly in 1975, and yet left to 
the erosion of time by policymakers in 2014, almost guaranteeing a scenario in some 
future date when a person performing the functions of a journalist will do so unprotected 
simply because they do not work for a large corporation, or in a format specifically cited 
by the law. 
 It was disappointing to see nowhere in the privacy subcommittee meeting minutes 
of the group proposing a revised shield statute in 2014 any mention of the fact that 
Nevada’s information apparatus—the traditional news media—teeters on the brink of 
irrelevance, thanks to endless cost-cutting and lay offs.  Such shrinkage marks most 
traditional U.S. media markets.  Consolidation and layoffs are as much a part of the 
!70
industry as good journalism anymore.  Most people’s newspapers are shells of their 
former selves.  More than 20 people were laid off at the Las Vegas Review-Journal in 
2011 and 13 more in 2013.  In 2009, its only local competitor, the Las Vegas Sun, laid off 
40 people.  In 2011, the Sun cut an additional dozen more staffers (Friess, 2011, Stutz, 
2011, Mitchell, 2014).  And as the industry’s footing further deteriorates, the public no 
doubt will shift farther and farther away from traditional outlets to other platforms.   
 The Pew Research Journalism Project noted in 2014 that while traditional news 
outlets continue to trim staffs and shrink page counts, online-only media brands such as 
BuzzFeed, ProPublica, Mashable and Vox Media—the kinds of digital news outlets that 
will populate the media landscape when the death knell sounds on the traditional media—
were adding journalists to their tech-heavy staffs (Mitchell, 2014).  Meanwhile, Moody’s 
Investors Service issued a negative Sept. 22, 2014 report on the outlook of the U.S. 
newspaper industry in which it predicted continued revenue losses through 2015.  The 
report also predicted further consolidation in the industry as a result.  Noting the 
industry’s feverish attempt to develop new digital products to replace dying traditional 
ones, the investor service noted that, for the most part, newspapers are simply not 
keeping up, and in fact, gains from online revenue are mostly short term and very small 
(Moody’s, 2014). 
 Enormous gaps in news coverage exist already thanks to corporate media’s focus 
on profits—or lack thereof—over public service.  Luckily, this invites new competition 
from emerging media.  It is too bad Nevada policymakers appear to lack the forward 
thinking needed to prepare the groundwork today for the inevitable collapse of traditional 
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media tomorrow.  Nevada’s shield law will certainly be near useless when that happens.  
Nevada journalists, too, share some of this blame.  In 1969 and 1975, efforts to first gain 
and then improve the state’s shield law were led by journalists.  But in 2014, journalists, 
under the auspices of the state’s press association, actively thwarted efforts to revise the 
law.  What does that portend for the future of journalism in Nevada?  As online ventures 
replace traditional, will Nevada’s press association be forced to endorse changing the 
shield law to be more inclusive?  Or will old media fight new media to protect its turf?   
Policymakers and journalists both should reflect on these questions and do what is right 
for the profession and the public it serves. 
Conclusion 
 This history of the Nevada shield law is the only one of its kind, but by no means 
is it complete.  For instance, a diligent search of the Reno Evening Gazette’s archives at 
the University of Nevada Las Vegas, did not yield a copy of the original story that led to 
Raggio threatening to put Lerude in jail if he did not give him the names “of those 
felons” smoking pot on the University of Nevada campus in 1968.  Many front page 
stories detailed pot arrests and the scourge of drugs in Reno, but the story Lerude cites as 
the spark that led to the creation of Nevada’s first shield law remains elusive.  Inevitably, 
lost to this history are comments from Raggio and Warren “Snowy” Monroe, key players 
in this historical drama who are now deceased.   
 Smith (2013) noted the near total absence from the literature of state shield law 
histories such as this one.  Future research in this regard then could endeavor to piece 
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together similar histories, perhaps providing a compendium of “on-the-ground” facts 
about how states across the country managed to wrangle shield laws—weak or strong, 
qualified or absolute—from their legislatures.  This could prove valuable in developing a 
better understanding of the ways the public and local elected officials express their 
commitment to sustaining a free and independent press outside of how courts have 
adjudged the matter.  Indeed, if it is up to the states to decide the fate of American 
journalism, then it may be critically important to the viability of this nation’s democratic 
society to compile, compare and analyze this data.  The media landscape has changed 
dramatically from founding fathers to Internet revolution.  While the information 
structures in America have evolved, prospered, perished and been replaced, journalism 
and the profoundly important role it plays in protecting democratic institutions has 
changed little.  Reporters protecting the identities of confidential sources from 
government overreach, a fundamental necessity of the journalism practice, has changed 
not at all.  Comfort can be taken in this fact.  Clearly, most Americans agree, since some 
form of protection allowing journalists to keep their confidences has been legislatively or 
judicially embraced by virtually every state in the nation.  
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APPENDICES 
 The following documents are copies of originals cited throughout the preceding 
thesis.  These are compiled here for historical reference.  They reflect the available public 
records regarding Nevada’s shield law, its origins, revisions to as well as later attempts to 
craft a more modern version.  The information contained in these documents offers a 
unique window into Nevada’s past. They also represent a unique, state-level glimpse at 
how a shield statute is created.  
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Report to the Nevada Technological Crimes Advisory Board (TCAB) 
From 
the Technical Privacy Subcommittee 
By 
Hal Berghel, Subcommittee Chair 
 
 
1. Background: The Technical Privacy Subcommittee was created by TCAB on September 5, 2013, and 
the members were appointed by Attorney General Cortez Masto on October 18, 2013.  The mission 
of  the  Subcommittee  is  “to  (1)  make  recommendations  to  the  Nevada  Attorney  General  and  
Technological Crime Advisory Board; (2) to monitor changes in international, federal, and state 
policy and legislation regarding technical privacy protections; and (3) serve an advisory function to 
the Nevada Attorney General and Technological Crime Advisory Board regarding the protection of 
personal privacy as it relates to technology in Nevada including, but not limited to, medical data, 
financial  information,  location  information,  and  communication.”   The initial Subcommittee 
members were: Hal Berghel, Prof. of Computer Science, UNLV (chair); Stephen Bates, Assoc. Prof of 
Journalism, UNLV; Dennis Cobb, consultant and former Deputy Chief of LVMPD; James Earl, Cyber 
Counsel for the State of Nevada; James Elste, CEO Cognitive Extension, Inc.; Allen Leichtenstein, 
General Counsel, ACLU of Nevada; Ira Victor, Digital Forensic Examiner, Data Clone Labs.  The 
assigned legal counsel is Brett Kandt, Special Deputy Attorney General and Executive Director of 
TCAB. 
2. The first “organizational” meeting was convened by conference call December 6, 2013.  At that time 
several strategic and tactical topics were brought before the Subcommittee for consideration 
including: 
a. The latitude of states to expand constitutional privacy protections to citizens 
b. Possible legislation that might expand the news shield privilege under NRS 49.275 
c. Possible legislation to expand state racketeering statutes NRS 207.360-.400] to include 
(possibly amended versions of) NRS 205A.040 and/or NRS 205.473-513. 
d. Possible revisions to the State of Nevada Online Privacy Policy 
e. Possible legislation to expand the State encryption Policy 
f. Possible legislation to prohibit Internet Service Providers from lowering the level of 
security/privacy without explicit customer notification 
g. Possible legislation to prohibit sale of security/privacy software that has been hobbled to 
lower protections below the level advertised 
h. Possible legislation to prohibit sale of software that has (a) known security limitations, or (b) 
back doors without complete disclosure in the end user license agreement (EULA) 
i. Possible  legislation  to  prohibit  the  operation  of  updating  services  (aka  “drizzlers)  for  any  
purpose other than those disclosed to the end user 
 
3. The second meeting was convened in-person via telecom facilities provided by the Attorney 
General’s  office on February 21, 2014.   
a. Of the initial topics considered at the December 6 meeting, the Subcommittee moved on 
items b. and parts of c. first.   
i. Stephen Bates and Allen Leichtenstein proposed a revision of the Nevada Shield Law 
that was positively received by the Subcommittee.  Bates and Leichtenstein will 
discuss their revision with the Nevada Press Association and report back to the 
Subcommittee at the next meeting April 17, 2014. 
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might be the best way.  All of that leads me to this conclusion, Dennis, great work, good 
security practices, let’s put this on the Office of Information Security to take up as a 
responsibility and try to move that forward.  Then focus specifically on the sort of what 
we think privacy-wise needs to be protected.   
 
Maybe that’s what we need ultimately is the kind of Rosetta stone classification 
schemes.  It will translate classification schemes from one agency to the next.    
 
Mr. Berghel: 
It makes good sense to me. 
 
12. Discussion and possible action on proposed legislation to expand the 
news shield privilege under NRS 49.275 to address gaps created by technology. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 




In some points, it is like the license plate reader issue in that it seems to be really timely 
and maybe more than I expected in the case of this.  The Media Law Resource Center 
has a model shield law they had a lot of suggestions for this but have said we should 
work together in the weeks to come and try to come up with something that everyone 
could benefit from.  I talked with Barry Smith from the Nevada Press Association.  We 
exchanged emails.  He had some good suggestions.  
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Allen, do you have anything to add to that? 
 
Mr. Lichtenstein: 
I kind of agree.  We have one of the stronger News Shield Laws of any place that I’m 
aware.  There is kind of “if it ain’t broke, don’t break it” feeling. 
 
Mr. ?? 
I would like to add some language that speaks of through any medium now in existence 
or exists in the future, to address when you have this new media that pop up so that 
way it kind of covers it.  The other question I have is on number 5 and I think that people 
do have this question of if a subpoena is issued.   
 
Mr. Berghel: 
In the interest of time, it’s obvious we are going to carry this over.  Does anyone in the 
North have any input for Allen and Stephen on the Shield Law? 
 
Mr. Elste: 
I wanted to share some of the feedback Jim Earl and I got from David and the folks at 
EFF this morning because we had some time on the call to have a discussion about the 
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Shield Law.  I found their comments rather informative.  The first thing that they said 
and I think you should take this to heart was that this is one of the “more rock solid” laws 
that they have seen.  They have been looking at news shield laws across the country so 
I think that speaks very well the language that Stephen and Allen have developed.  
They told us that they looked for certain things in Shield Laws and three of the things 
they looked for were really protection of the journalistic sources, like the identity of 
sources, the documentary information that they use to produce a journalistic output, like 
notes, photos, etc., so making sure that our language is expansive enough to cover not 
just the product that they produce but also all of the material that goes into producing 
that product.  The third thing was the eye-witness observations that they collected in the 
form of developing that journalistic output.   
 
One of probably the most important pieces of feedback and one that I think will bear 
some discussion for our group is that they look at the type of information that is covered 
and who does that apply to.  From EFF’s perspective, it is the functional definition of 
journalism that’s more important than a status definition of journalism.  I believe what we 
have in the current language is  you have to be a certain type of journalist to be covered 
as opposed to looking strictly speaking at the act of journalism, the function of creating 
or otherwise producing journalistic output.  We may want to consider looking at a way to 
functionally define journalism as opposed to what is currently a series of labels as if you 
are one of these, then you’re a journalist.  Part of that is encompassing non sort of 
news-related journalist and folks who are for instance, a book author who may be doing 
investigative journalism of a sort to produce a book that will not be regularly published 
or meet that regularity requirement.  I think that one really resonated for me because an 
unpublished author who is doing investigative journalism or producing a book that is 
using investigative techniques may well need the same sort of protection.  Those were 
the primary elements of feedback received.   
 
Mr. Earl: 
Essentially, the position we took after EFF laid out its functionality preference was to 
say, OK, I can kind of understand what you mean conceptually where you would like to 
define the scope of application based on function rather than on definitions and this 
extends to a protected class which is described this way for this list of protected things.  
We went on to say that’s fine, if we understand that conceptually, can you give us some 
examples of the type of functional definitions that you think we might want to consider 
substituting for the ones that exist right now.  My recollection is that they were going to 
provide Jim Elste with some examples.  As soon as that happens, my suggestion would 




Happy to do so. 
 
Barry Smith: 
I am Director of the Nevada Press Association and would like it on the record that I am 
here and willing to help and answer any questions and be of assistance however I can. 
18 
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Thank you.  You are in contact with him I take it, Stephen? Do you have enough to 
proceed with your next revision?  I’m interested in looking at how different states 
address it.  We’ll carry this over for the next meeting.   
 
13. Discussion and possible action on proposed amendments to NRS 205.473-
.513, inclusive, “Unlawful Acts Regarding Computers and Information Services”. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
We’ll carry this over for the next meeting as well. 
  
14. Discussion and possible action on request for Nevada Legislature to pass 
joint resolution calling on Nevada congressional delegation to expand online 
privacy rights under federal law. 
 
Mr. Earl: 
Nothing additional but my recollection of in terms of how a legislator would move 
forward with a change to the Nevada Constitution under Item 10 is pretty much the 
same way that any joint resolution would be handled.  If we are moving forward drafting 
one joint resolution which would have the effect putting forward an amendment to the 
Constitution, we might view this other as simply yet another joint resolution to be 
formulated.  Is that fair? 
 
Mr. Kandt: 
I think what Jim is saying and I would agree is that with both the proposals under Item 
10 and 14 – they are pretty straightforward.  You’ve already taken action on Item 10.  I 
think you could take action on Item 14 without any specific language because that 
would actually be drafted by LCB upon the legislator’s request.  If you wanted to take 
action on 14 today, and then those are ready to go to the Tech Crime Advisory Board 
for their consideration, and then, possibly being picked up by one or more legislators. 
 
Mr. Elste: 
Should we develop a draft of what that request should look like so that it’s more 
formalized in terms of what we’re asking them to produce without necessarily producing 
the actual resolution that they are going to use?  Is that the next logical step for us? 
 
Mr. Kandt: 
I don’t think it’s a necessary step, that’s up to you whether you want to do that or not but 
just in terms of presenting it to a legislator, I don’t think you even need that much 
specificity.   
 
Mr. Elste: 
I would tend to advocate for us providing some specificity so that it was clear what we’re 
asking that legislator or the Tech Crime Advisory Board to agree to and take forward or 
what we’re asking the legislature to do.  I think if we put it out there as a request for 
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Just a comment on the list of statutes and Supreme Court decisions – the attorney general’s office in 
California recently published a similar type of compendium of California statutes, decisions and made that 
available publicly on their website.  We may well want to consider trying to take the work that Allen has 
done and see if we can assist in developing something similar because it’s great that we’ve been able to 
identify certain statutes that are relevant, it would be even better to socialize those broadly to the public at 
large.   
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Good point.  Any other comments?  Brett, I would like two action items to come out of this – one, that as 
time permits, Allen will get to me the report in advance of our next meeting which I will then send to Brett for 
distribution; and secondly, since Jim Elste has already seen the California document, if you could kindly 
send me the URL, I will put it in my little notebook which of course, is available to all of you online. 
 
Mr. Lichtenstein: 
Just as an aside, as an attorney who also is licensed in and does practice in California, I think it’s fairly safe 
to say that California has a much more detailed statutory scheme for things like this which tends to have a 
much shorter list of statutes.   
 
Mr. Berghel: 
I think that would be a useful point of departure for us when we take up this topic at that next meeting that is 
what the difference is between what we hear from Allen concerning the Nevada statutes and what Jim is 
telling us about the California statutes.  We might be able to extract from the difference some areas that 
need direction for us.  I’d like to see us discuss that at the next meeting.   
 
9. Discussion and possible action on proposed legislation to expand the news shield privilege 
under NRS 49.275 to address gaps created by technology.  
 
Mr. Berghel: 
As per the request of our guest, we will take Item 9 next.  Discussion and possible action on the proposed 
legislation to expand the Nevada Shield Law.  It’s my understanding that you have taken the lead on this 
Stephen, so please do so. 
 
Mr. Bates:  
As mentioned at the last meeting we are recommending a functional approach so that we talk about a 
person that does journalism rather than an employment-based approach.  I have some statutes and I would 
think the strongest argument for a penalty is the third party provision.  If a subpoena is issued to you, you 
file a motion to quash that’s the end but you find a subpoena is issued for your telephone records, as a 
reporter, and they didn’t give you the requisite notice and the chance to object, then I wonder if should be 
penalty of some sort.   
 
Mr. Lichtenstein: 
I’m trying to get a vision of how that would work in a practical sense.  I just can’t sit here and issue a 
subpoena, there needs to be a party and I guess you would talk about a third party subpoena; it would be 
up to the court to provide that notice.  Certainly, we are going to run into a particular problem in terms of any 
penalty is that there is a court involved.  You don’t get to penalize the court. This is something that we were 
talking about before we came in.  That doesn’t prevent filing anti-SLAPP suit in terms of abuse of process 
and the like. 
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Stephen is referring to the conversation I had with him and then later with Allen about my digital security 
patent that I am putting on now.  I wouldn’t make a distinction between de facto and de jure penalties.  The 
de jure penalties are the ones that our lawyer colleagues are familiar with.  The de facto penalties are the 
ones that accrue by what Allen refers to as nuisance actions on the part of attorneys that have the effect, in 
the case of journalists, primarily, potentially forcing them into bankruptcy trying to defend themselves.  I had 
an example in mind, the journalist that this happened to but I can’t think of the name right now, however, I 
can come up with the name and that is the prosecution of Drake who was accused of leaking classified 
information to a newspaper and that prosecution went on for 6 years and bankrupted Drake.  At the end of 6 
years, the judge said I don’t understand why we are dealing with this.  There’s no substance here, 
dismissed.  From the government’s point of view, according to Drake, there’s some argument for that.  The 
government got what they wanted.  He’s in terrible financial shape and anybody that saw that case is well 
aware of the fact that they don’t need to find you guilty in a court of law to silence you.  They can simply ruin 
you.  Now, the thing is which was where I was headed with this, Drake, as I understand, has no recourse.   
 
Mr. Lichtenstein: 
I’m not familiar with the case.  Is this a criminal prosecution? 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Under the 1917 Espionage Act. 
 
Mr. Lichtenstein: 
Unfortunately, criminal prosecutions from places like the NSA are very hard to fight.  NSA, itself, if very hard 
to fight because they don’t want to disclose much of anything  
In a civil matter, however, one might say if a defendant can always pursue under a civil rights violation 
where you can get attorneys’ fees. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
We’ve got a few attorneys on our committee.  Are we trying to take an action on this, Brett, so we can give 
this to the Attorney General as a recommendation? 
 
Mr. Kandt: 
Timing is somewhat key here.  You’ve got a number of items listed as action items.  I have actually listed all 
of these as potential action items on the agenda for the Tech Crime Advisory Board when it meets next 
Thursday and that is I realize you may not take action on all of these items but to the extent you did, I 
wanted the Tech Crime Advisory Board to be able to consider them next week because time is of the 
essence in terms of any proposal for legislation is going to have to find a sponsor.  That process is already 
taking place right now and is already in full swing.  For legislators, they have to submit their bill draft 
requests, they start in August, they have a timeframe between August and December 10th, I think.  The 
Attorney General’s bill draft package has to be submitted by September 2nd.  Executive Branch state 
agencies are already submitting their requests to the governor’s office because they have to have theirs 
submitted by August 1st so that process is already in full swing so to the extent you wanted to get anything 




We are all thinking about whether this shield law is potentially ready for prime time.  Could we ask our guest 
to identify himself and chime in with whatever comment he might care to make. 
 
Mr. Smith: 
I’m Director of the Nevada Press Association.  I think I didn’t really have a lot to comment on because I do 
think this is a good approach.  This is the right approach, the way this ought to be addressed.  I would just 5-30-14  Minutes TCAB Subcommittee Meeting Page 4 
 
APPENDIX P  
2014 PRIVACY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES (5/30/14)—page 3 
 
!117
reiterate that I expect that it still will make members of my association and others nervous to be touching 
the Shield Law at all.  I’m contradicting myself and I would advise them that this is way we ought to be going 
but I’m just telling you that that I won’t have a unanimous response to that.   
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Barry, what might this committee do to assuage their fears?   We are, after all, trying to do this for the 
journalists in the state. 
 
Mr. Smith: 
Exactly, I think it’s a good policy discussion that ought to be taking place in front of the legislature so I would 
discourage you from presenting this or similar language to try to this approach and have that discussion.  I 
just would say that I can envision not only members of my association but others not being in unanimous 
support of it and being nervous about opening that up at all.  I would discourage you from preparing what 
you think is the best approach because I do think it is beneficial in the long run. 
 
Mr. Bates: 
I wonder if members of your association might be not as keenly interested in the definition  
 
Mr. Smith: 
I think that’s beneficial, yes.  And, again, I don’t have, as you say, for the most part, my members are 
protected because they are defined under the law.  They work for an organization where this is headed is 
this definition of the practice instead of the job.  I don’t have a few of my member who aren’t covered by the 
current shield law.  That’s why I say, it’s the right approach, in my opinion, and that it’s a good policy 
discussion to place before the legislature. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 






OK, that’s an important consideration because once the legislature decides to deal with something, they 
can decide that don’t believe in shield laws and just revoke the whole thing.  Certainly, it’s a legitimate point.  
Brett, Jim Earl, you know about how the legislative process works.  Is the way to deal with this to try to 




In terms of my approach to a bill, building consensus but then you stakeholders beforehand, there’s a 
process whereby the bill gets assigned to a committee and then reaching out to the committee chair and 
those members to explain the purpose of the bill and answer any questions even before it gets heard in a 
committee, is an important step.  Reaching out to leadership so the speaker, the majority leader, and even 
the leadership in the minority parties would also be a part of the process as well.  It differs depending upon 
whether it’s a bill that’s being carried by a legislator versus a bill that’s coming out of the executive branch 
but that’s generally the approach I take.   
 
Mr. Earl: 
Let me add to that in terms of trying to address some of the practicalities that face us as a subcommittee.  
The way which this might work is the following, or at least the way I would envision it: 
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If we were to recommend this for consideration by the Tech Crime Advisory Board, assuming that there is 
complete board membership at that next meeting next week, then you would have the following potential 
sponsors exposed to the text.  You would have the Attorney General, and you would have the senator and 
assemblyperson who are members of the Tech Crime Advisory Board exposed to the text.  The way which I 
would approach this, given the discussion that has taken place so far, and I can certainly understand the 
reason why any constituent who or any constituency that feels it has been favored in some way by existing 
legislation, is very reluctant to that legislation opened for what might be to them, a marginal benefit given 
that the risks of some type of renegade legislative response.  I think that there is a different way to cast this 
in terms of economic development and that is there’s a growing blogging community if you are a successful 
blogger, you don’t have to be located in New York of San Francisco or Los Angeles, you might as well be 
located in Las Vegas or Douglas County or Incline Village.  If you somewhat attracted to any of those areas 
anywhere, the existence of a shield law that would cover you might, in fact, be sufficient to get you to come 
to Nevada and write from here.  In addition to those legislators who we would normally think of having some 
type of interest and membership of the Tech Crime Advisory Board, there may be others that other 
members of this particular body may know who would see this from an economic development perspective.  
I’d just as soon have as many smart writers in the state as we can possibly get, frankly. 
 
Mr. Victor: 
I think that’s an outstanding idea by Mr. Earl.  Now, full disclosure, I am somewhat involved in blogs and 
podcasts so I am biased but those biases acknowledged, I think it’s a great idea and to that end, the 
comments that you made, Mr. Chairman, about requiring payments of attorney fees for harassing 
subpoenas and also penalty for anyone who issues a third party subpoena without the requisite  five days, I 
think some language that helps shield independent bloggers and podcasters and such from that sort of 
litigation would also encourage them to come here.  I’m thinking about subpoenas that require voluminous 
electronic information can be a burden to an independent writer who may have data on cloud systems, on 
servers in an office, may have data backup or located in other places and backup tapes and subpoenas that 
require that are often written to say ALL information are a huge burden to third parties that receive those 
subpoenas.  By carving out some safe harbor and some provisions to protect bloggers and independent 
journalists would again go to Mr. Earl’s point that this becomes a great place to be a writer entrepreneur 
and build it up.  And, I would remind for the record, some very successful  what are considered now as 
establishment news sites were started as blogs, Tech Crunch, for example, Huffington Post, these were 
independent  bloggers basically that then became so popular that we now consider them the media but they 
really were the seedlings, they were bloggers.  This is a significant area of public good because it 
disseminates more and more information and a source of economic growth to those communities where 
these once bloggers but now real legitimate larger businesses locate.   
 
Mr. Elste: 
Two thoughts: one just to build on this question of protecting against legal costs – I would advocate against 
putting that into the shield law.  This is a law that is directed at fundamentally First Amendment privileges.  
Let’s not muddy the waters by trying to solve the problem of the cost of litigation.  That is a completely 
separate issue that  is something that should probably be handled  as a separate piece of statutory 
language and keep the focus of the shield law on what we define as journalism; what sort of protections 
we’re going to afford those people that are journalists or by practicing journalism.  We need to try to keep 
this as focused as possible on the act of providing that shield. 
The second observation I had was for Barry which is I can certainly understand the concerns of even 
touching the existing language; however, would it be helpful if the members of your organization have the 
opportunity to have discussions with folks on our committee or otherwise have some dialogue around this to 
see both the rationale behind the language that’s been put together and some of the genesis of that in 
terms of conversations with EFF and try to conquer their support.  I think this is a piece of potential 
legislation that really does advance the cause for protecting journalists and journalism in affording those 
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First Amendment Rights.  It would be a shame not to have the press association shoulder to shoulder with 
us at the table.   
 
Mr. Smith: 
I absolutely agree that the dilemma I’m in is very well summarized.  My constituency is 90% protected by 
the existing but my future constituency is not so that’s what I am trying to balance myself and that’s why I 
say, it’s the right approach, it’s the right thing to do and I absolutely agree.  I think intellectually, they would 
agree with me that this would be groundbreaking in some respects.  It’s absolute, again, that it is the correct 
approach and the right way to do things; it doesn’t mean they wouldn’t be nervous about it. 
Mr. Elste: 
One other thought, a lot of the sources of information for your 90% that are covered as professional 
journalists are the bloggers, are the people that are out there gathering this information, .  There’s an 
economic incentive for your protected members or professional journalist members. 
 
Mr. Smith: 
If I might, when you talk about legislation and you talk about how its approach to be brought into the 
legislature and you start talking about anything that kind of expands the scope, you start to bring in other 
potential parties that have an interest in it, stakeholders, that will for one reason or another, object to 
anything else you put in there.  Just to bring that up from my experience and pretty obvious but I thought I’d 
throw that out.  Thank you. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Do I sense that we are in agreement that we’ll go with what we have, we’re not going to try to embellish it?  
It’s my sense of the discussion that this is a winning proposition for the journalists if legislators see this as 
an opportunity to strengthen our already strong shield law.  I think we should assume that the legislators will 
see the benefit, think of the big picture and be inclined to support it.  We should proceed on that basis.   
As a practical consideration, this subcommittee is going to have to decide whether to recommend it to the 
TCAB and secondly, we should know from Barry what we can do to help his constituency recognize the 
value of enlarging the statute. 
Let’s take the latter first:  Barry, what can we do to help get the word out with your constituency? 
 
Mr. Smith: 
It’s kind of up to me to get it out to them but to certainly be open to the questions and provide the 
information and I think if they had been at this meeting today and heard what was said in the discussion that  
would be far more comfortable if this same discussion was what happened before a legislative committee, 
I’d have no problem but again, you never know what’s going to happen so It will be up to me to explain to 
them and any help I can get as far as to what the language is from Stephen he certainly has lots of contacts 
in the south.  We have some time to make to make them comfortable.  I appreciate any help we can get. 
 
Mr. Earl: 
At an appropriate time, I’m prepared to move that we recommend the current text to the Tech Crime 
Advisory Board for consideration and possible adoption by either the Attorney General or one of the 
participating legislators into a BDR.  Part of the reason that I say that in addition to what you’ve already 
heard me say is that I think that there needs to be something around which to distill and discuss, and I don’t 
want to speak for Barry, but if I were in his position, it would be easier for me to gather my constituents and 
say, look, there’s something you really need to pay attention to because this potential piece of legislation 
took a baby step on the last day of May when the subcommittee of the Tech Crime Advisory Board voted to 
recommend it. I don’t know who that could be, to put before the EFF or for the blogger communities in 
addition to what the various positions are.  At the appropriate time, I’d be willing to make that motion.   
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All in favor, say Aye.  Opposed?  Failing to hear any opposition, we will report that the unanimous 
recommendation of the quorum to recommend this to the TCAB. 
 
Mr. Kandt:  
Just for clarification, since there are the current, we’ve got a couple of different drafts, and some discussion 
at the bottom about some definitions under the functional approach, could I ask Mr. Bates just to maybe 
over the weekend, could you clean it up into the final and email it to me and I will make sure that is what the 








I don’t want to give them this.  I don’t want to give them these two pages because it won’t be clear to them 
and I don’t feel it’s my place to cut and paste them.  I think it’s appropriate for you, if you just send me what 
you want presented to the board, I’ll make sure it gets to them. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Barry, thank you for participating and would it be possible for you and select members of your organization 
to come to the next TCAB meeting?   
 
Mr. Smith: 
I plan to be there.  I’ll probably get the word out tomorrow morning that this is some recommended 
language and we’ll see what kind of reaction I get.  I will let them know that meeting is going to happen and 
they won’t have any excuse for not paying attention.  Thank you, again, for letting me interrupt your agenda. 
 
6. Report from James Elste on request for assistance from Electronic Frontier Foundation to develop 
legislation to expand online privacy rights. (Discussion Only) Action may not be taken on any matter 
brought up under this agenda item until scheduled on an agenda for action at a later meeting.  
 
Mr. Elste: 
I don’t have very much to report other than after our last meeting’s discussion on the engagement of the 
EFF, I did pass along both Allen and Stephen’s contact information and, if I’m judging correctly, you, 
gentleman, has a subsequent conversation with EFF and it was fruitful and helped influence the language in 
the Shield Law.  I would say, in many respects, we’ve opened up the dialogue with EFF and they are strong 
supporters of work we are doing here.  I hope we will continue to move forward on that. 
 
Mr. Berghel:   
Thank you.  Any discussion on Item 6?  Brett, I think we can take that off the next agenda. 
 
7. Discussion and possible action on proposed amendment to the Nevada Constitution establishing a 
right to privacy.  5-30-14  Minutes TCAB Subcommittee Meeting Page 8 
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Nevada Shield Law—Revised 
 





      NRS 49.275  News media.  No reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any 
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any radio or television station may be 
required to disclose any published or unpublished information obtained or prepared by such 
person in such person’s professional capacity in gathering, receiving or processing information 
for communication to the public, or the source of any information procured or obtained by such 
person, in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation: 
      1.  Before any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury or any officer thereof. 
      2.  Before the Legislature or any committee thereof. 
      3.  Before any department, agency or commission of the State. 






1. “News organization” means a newspaper, periodical, press association, radio station, 
television station, online source of information about current events, or book publisher. 
2. “Journalist” means a reporter, editor, writer, researcher, photographer, videographer, or 
editorial worker, currently or formerly employed by or under contract to a news organization, or 
whose work appears in one or more news organizations. 
3. “Legal proceeding” means any hearing, trial, or investigation: 
(a)  Before any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury, or any officer thereof. 
(b)  Before the Legislature or any committee thereof. 
(c)  Before any department, agency, or commission of the State. 
(d)  Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local 
government. 
4. No journalist may be required to disclose any published or unpublished information 
obtained, related to, or prepared by such person in such person’s professional capacity in 
gathering, receiving, or processing information for communication to the public, or the source of 
any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding. 
5. A party issuing a subpoena in any legal proceeding to a third party that seeks the 
records of a journalist or a news organization shall provide notice of the subpoena to both the 
journalist and the news organization at least five days before issuing the subpoena. The notice 
shall include, at a minimum, an explanation of why the requested records will be of material 
assistance to the party seeking them and why alternate sources of information are not sufficient 
to avoid the need for the subpoena. 
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      NRS 49.275  News media.  No reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any 
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any radio or television station may be 
required to disclose any published or unpublished information obtained or prepared by such 
person  in  such  person’s  professional  capacity  in  gathering,  receiving  or  processing  information  
for communication to the public, or the source of any information procured or obtained by such 
person, in any legal proceedings, trial or investigation: 
      1.  Before  any  court,  grand  jury,  coroner’s  inquest,  jury  or  any  officer  thereof. 
      2.  Before the Legislature or any committee thereof. 
      3.  Before any department, agency or commission of the State. 
    4.  Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local 
government. 
 
May 2014 draft: 
 
1.  “Journalism”  means  gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, filming, 
recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing information concerning matters of potential 
interest for dissemination to a segment of the public, in any medium of expression that currently 
exists or shall exist in the future. 
2.  “Legal  proceeding”  means  any  hearing,  trial,  or  investigation: 
(a) before  any  court,  grand  jury,  coroner’s  inquest,  jury,  or  any  officer  thereof; 
(b) before the Legislature or any committee thereof; 
(c) before any department, agency, or commission of the State; or 
(d) before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local 
government. 
3. In any legal proceeding, no person or entity engaged in activities of journalism may be 
required to disclose any published or unpublished information related in any way to activities of 
journalism engaged in by any person or entity.  
4. A party issuing a subpoena in any legal proceeding to a third party that seeks the 
records of a person or entity engaged in activities of journalism shall provide notice of the 
subpoena to the person or entity at least five days before issuing the subpoena. The notice shall 
include, at a minimum, an explanation of why the requested records will be of material 
assistance to the party seeking them and why alternate sources of information are not sufficient 
to avoid the need for the subpoena. 
5. In the case of a person or entity whose activities do not fall within the definition of 
“journalism”  set  forth  in  subsection  (1),  a  judge  may exercise discretion to apply the provisions 
of subsections (3) and (4) if the judge determines that doing so would serve the interest of justice 
by aiding or protecting activities related in any way to the dissemination of information. 
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April 2014 draft:  
 
1.  “News  organization”  means  a  newspaper,  periodical,  press  association,  radio  station,  
television station, online source of information about current events, or book publisher. 
2.  “Journalist”  means  a  reporter,  editor,  writer,  researcher,  photographer,  videographer,  or  
editorial worker, currently or formerly employed by or under contract to a news organization, or 
whose work appears in one or more news organizations. 
3.  “Legal  proceeding”  means  any  hearing,  trial,  or  investigation: 
(a)  Before  any  court,  grand  jury,  coroner’s  inquest,  jury,  or  any  officer  thereof. 
(b)  Before the Legislature or any committee thereof. 
(c)  Before any department, agency, or commission of the State. 
(d)  Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local 
government. 
4. No journalist may be required to disclose any published or unpublished information 
obtained,  related  to,  or  prepared  by  such  person  in  such  person’s  professional  capacity  in  
gathering, receiving, or processing information for communication to the public, or the source of 
any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding. 
5. A party issuing a subpoena in any legal proceeding to a third party that seeks the 
records of a journalist or a news organization shall provide notice of the subpoena to both the 
journalist and the news organization at least five days before issuing the subpoena. The notice 
shall include, at a minimum, an explanation of why the requested records will be of material 
assistance to the party seeking them and why alternate sources of information are not sufficient 
to avoid the need for the subpoena. 
 
EFF recommends the functional definition in (1) and the safety net in (5), though the 
language may need tweaking. 
I  assume  that  we  needn’t  define  “public,”  i.e.,  audience. 
Hal  wonders  if  there’s  a  way  to  require  payment  of  attorney’s  fees  or  some  such  for  
harassing subpoenas. Helpful?  
Is it feasible and worthwhile to include some sort of penalty for anyone who issues a 
third-party  subpoena  without  the  requisite  five  days’  notice? 
 




1. The  term  ‘journalism’  means  the  gathering,  preparing,  collecting,  photographing,  recording,  
writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or information that concerns local, national, or 
international events or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the public. 
(House shield law bill)  
 
 
the  term  “a  representative  of  the  news  media”  means  any  person  or  entity  that  gathers  
information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw 
materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience. 
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D.  Legislation to expand the news shield privilege under NRS 49.275 to address gaps 
created by technology   
The Shield Law is in your back up.  A lot of these have back up items but they’re not fully 
gestated at this point.  The point of the Shield Law modification revision was this:  Modern 
journalism is no longer restricted to the traditional journalistic employers, by that I mean, 
publishers, newspapers, electronic media outlets like television news rooms and the like.  
Now, we are seeing blogospheres delivering fairly high quality and in some cases, accurate  
reporting and the Subcommittee would like to remind the Board that many of the accepted 
online venues for news coverage, such as the Huffington Post and the blogospheres such 
as that are considered to be fairly reliable and useful.  But they are not protected under the 
Nevada Statute as it now stands so we’ve proposed a revision to that statute that seeks to 
incorporate coverage to those who act as journalists not based on the nature of the 
employment relationship.  I’m not a lawyer so I’m going to have to leave it to Madame 
Chair’s discretion whether this is something that she would feel comfortable in supporting.   
It is our feeling that is, the Privacy Subcommittee’s feeling, that in the absence of a federal 
Shield Law, we are still, I would remind all of us that are non-lawyers, we are still operating 
under Brandsburg which means there is no federal protection at all.  It’s left to the states to 
protect journalism.  We see cases all of the time these days where the federal government 
has decided to suppress a journalist for covering some piece of newsworthy information or 
other.  To the extent that it is possible to protect the journalists, it has to be done at the 
state level.  We propose that the already excellent Nevada statute be further enhanced.  




So, the way I am looking at Agenda Item Number D in the actual proposal is the law 
already exists and the enhancement is to include or broaden it to include technology and 




Yes, it’s worded in such a way that we don’t have to be technology focused because by the 
time we get the new statute passed, the technology will have changed again.  We’ve 
endeavored in this proposed statute revision to expand the coverage on the basis of the 
function of the journalist not the particular manner or means by which they apply their 
journalistic skills.  
 
Mr. Owens: 
I have on question.  I am certainly not an attorney but as a law enforcement representative, 
I would just have a concern – would this then give any blogger the right to be shielded 
pretty much anybody that posts anything for others to see that we would not be able to 
require them to give up sources or specific information. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Yes, the intent is that if a person is engaged in journalism and the definition here is 
provided in that first paragraph, so to the extent that a person is doing that, yes, they would 
be covered.  Whether the activity is represented by some kind of newsprint or an online 
source. 
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At face value, that isn’t something that I’d be wanting to support from the law enforcement 
aspect of it. 
 
General Masto: 
I have a follow-up – did you reach out or talk with the press association regarding this. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Yes, Madame Chair, we did engage them.  Brett, what was Brian’s last name? 
 
Mr. Kandt: 
Barry Smith with the Nevada Press Association. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Please let Barry address the question that was just raised. 
 
Mr. Smith: 
I am Barry Smith, Director of the Nevada Press Association. I was fortunate enough and 
appreciate the Privacy Subcommittee letting me talk to them a couple of times.  This is an 
issue very near and dear to the Press Association where this came from originally.  We do 
have, in Nevada, one of the best Shield Laws in the nation.  It does, as I told them, for 90 
percent of my members, we’re covered and we’re covered very well so our point of view is 
that we are kind of hesitant to touch it.   
 
On the other hand, I did express to the Subcommittee that this is a good way to go about 
looking at this issue.  Not so much who is covered but what their intent is, what activity that 
they are actually doing.  As you see in the language, it really changes it from covering a 
journalist to covering acts of journalism.  I think it’s a good approach from the Press 
Association’s point of view, for the most part, as I say, most of our members are 
newspapers covered explicitly by the statute.  I do have members though and I expect I will 
more members in the future who are not specifically defined in that statute as being 
covered by the Shield Law.  So far, there have been a couple of instances in the state and 
district court level where the issue has come up and the judges have pretty liberally 
construed that if it looks like a newspaper, the quote I used is just because you are reading 
a book on a Kindle doesn’t mean it’s not a book.  So just because you are reading a 
newspaper online, doesn’t mean it’s not a newspaper.  But, that’s not the way the statute 




Thank you.  I guess let me ask you a question that relates to what Jim Owens just brought 
up.  I guess the question I would have for the press association is do you see a distinction 
when we define journalism between your membership and maybe, somebody who is 
blogging online their journal or topical information but they are not related to per say a news 
organization.  Is there a distinction in your mind or with respect to your association? 
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Yes, I do think there is a distinction.  It’s becoming more blurred all the time and this was 
pointed out some of the most popular, best read, news sources in the country.  It would not 
qualify as a newspaper or TV or broadcast, radio broadcast organization. So, it does get 
into a very tricky question of defining what is journalism and that’s why, on the federal level, 
so far, and there have been several attempts, it has not been defined, it is difficult to say 
what a person is doing.  Once you get into when you are hired, there is a presumption of 
some level of education, training, skill, responsibility, those kinds of things. That’s why the 
shorthand has generally been you work for a media organization.  Is that helpful at all? 
 
General Masto: 
Yes, thank you.  Any further comments or questions? 
 
Mr. Owens: 
Just for some clarification for me so according to this, if a blogger or a person who posts on 
their Facebook to his fellow criminal his particular gang, these are the crimes, they take 
pictures of some of the things they’ve done because it has interest to a particular segment 
of the public, his fellow gang members, so that’s now protected and we can’t bring him or 
require him to provide any additional information other than what he has posted?   
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Jim, I’m not an attorney.  My guess is that that is the kind of thing that would be resolved by 
a court.  That’s part of the process.  The intent here, I think, is, as Barry has pointed out, is 
pretty clear.  The future of journalism for especially the younger set does not involve 
traditional means.  That is many of us no longer subscribe to a newspapers or magazines 
for that matter but we are vociferous consumers of online content and if for no other reason 
than economic incentives, the spoils will go to the aggressive in attracting businesses to the 
states that provide these kinds of Shield Laws.  That is, if you want a Huffington Post to 
start up in your midst, this kind of Shield Law that we proposed would be an incentive over 
a state that doesn’t have this secure Shield Law.  Now, when it comes to the details of how 
the laws are sorted out and how the prosecutors handle it, that’s something, an issue that 
really should be left to an attorney.  I’m not one. 
 
General Masto: 
Any other comments? 
 
E.  Legislation to amend NRS 205.473-.513, inclusive, “Unlawful Acts Regarding 
Computers and Information Service”. 
 
Mr. Berghel: 
Legislation to amend the statute on computer abuse.  I am actually drafting that.  I’ll give 
you a little background because I have nothing to propose at this time.  The law itself was 
well intentioned but I presume written a very long time ago.  The language is dated and I 
think it has serious issues. From a prosecutorial point of view, I would imagine it would be 
very difficult to enforce this law.  I’ve taken the initiative to re-write it and it’s probably, Brett, 












TECHNOLOGICAL CRIME ADVISORY BOARD 
Technical Privacy Subcommittee 
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING 
August 29, 2014 at 1:30 PM 
 
The meeting took place at the following locations: 
Office of the Attorney General, Mock Courtroom 
100 N. Carson Street, Carson City, NV 89701-4717 
and 
Office of the Attorney General, Grant Sawyer Building 
555 East Washington Avenue, Suite 3315, Las Vegas, NV 89101 
 
1. Call to Order and Roll Call.  
 
Hal Berghel, Chair; James Elste; Ira Victor; Stephen Bates Dennis Cobb.  
Not Present: James Earl; Allen Lichtenstein. A quorum was established. 
 
2. Public Comment. (Discussion Only) Action may not be taken on any matter 
brought up under this agenda item until scheduled on an agenda for action at a 
later meeting.  
 
There was no public comment.  
 
3. Chair’s Welcome. (Chair)  
 
Mr. Berghel welcomed the members to the fifth meeting of the Subcommittee.  
 
4. Report on Technological Crime Advisory Board meeting of June 5, 2014, and 
status of approved resolutions for Technical Privacy Subcommittee.  
 
Mr. Berghel stated that the Subcommittee’s resolutions were discussed at the Board 
meeting. There was some opposition to the proposals from the representative for the 
Clark County Sheriff and from Senator Ford.  The Sheriff’s representative was uneasy 
with any proposal increasing the protection of privacy without studying the full 
ramifications in regards to police investigations. Mr. Berghel asked for Mr. Kandt’s 
assessment.  
 
Mr. Kandt reviewed the four proposals made by the Committee: 
 1) To amend the news shield law.  
2) To add the word “privacy” to the Nevada Constitution.  
3) To seek a joint resolution from the Nevada Legislature to call upon the 
federal congressional delegation to look at expanding privacy protections 
at the Federal level.  
4)  The proposal to amend NRS 179.045 to permit the application for and 
issuance of search warrants by electronic transmission.  
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He reported that the Board did not endorse the first three proposals. With regards to the news 
shield privilege, the representative from the Nevada Press Association was there and 
indicated that 90% of his people are already covered and he was reticent to opening up the 
statute to try to cover the other 10%.  
 
With regard to all three of the proposals not endorsed by the Board, the biggest concern was 
whether these proposals were outside the Board’s statutory scope. The fourth item, they 
believed, did fall within their scope and they did endorse it.  They will support amending the 
search warrant statute provided there are appropriate protections and precautions.  The 
proposal has been included in a bill draft request in the Attorney General’s legislative package 
that was submitted to the legislature.  
 
Given the concerns that the other proposals were outside the statutory authority of the Board, 
Mr. Kandt suggested that, because the work of this Subcommittee is so important, perhaps it 
should be created as a stand-alone advisory board to look at all issues regarding digital and 
technological privacy. Mr. Kandt stated he had spoken to Assemblyman David Bobzien, and 
they had discussed the idea of having the legislature create a separate advisory board to look 
at technological and digital privacy.  Assemblyman Bobzien was very receptive to the idea and 
said he would be willing to put in a bill draft request to create an advisory board.  Mr. Kandt 
stated that digital privacy is the major civil rights issue moving forward and it would be 
appropriate to have an advisory commission to study issues and make recommendations to 
the legislature.  
 
Mr. Berghel stated that the original proposal he had made to the Attorney General two years 
ago was for a board to make recommendations to the Attorney General and somehow it got 
changed so that the Subcommittee reported to the Board.  
 
In regards to the first three proposals, Mr. Berghel stated that the Board never took action on 
them; rather\\, the Attorney General as chair tabled them.  He clarified that it was Senator 
Ford—not the entire Board—who stated his concern that the privacy resolutions fell outside 
the Board’s statutory authority.  Otherwise he agreed with Mr. Kandt’s assessment. 
 
Mr. Elste thought the results of the Board meeting were disappointing. He was concerned that 
the Subcommittee has spent the better part of a year on the proposals and had pulled together 
a group with expertise in the field who are able to give good counsel. With three of the 
proposals tabled, it concerns him that the group may feel that their efforts are not appreciated 
and that their time is better spent elsewhere.  It is important for Nevada to have a body whose 
responsibility is to look at privacy issues. He agrees that this is the civil rights issue of our age.  
The issues are complicated and it takes people who are focused on privacy issues in the 
digital age to unravel them.  He stated that perhaps the question is about the future of the 
group and expressed hope that it can find a better structure or attachment point so it can 
advance its agenda and continue with its mandate to examine privacy issues.  
 
Mr. Victor agreed that this Board needs to exist separately, and that the issue is an important.  
Nevada needs to be on the cutting edge for the sake of the public, businesses and technology 
in Nevada.  
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Mr. Kandt added that Mr. Berghel is correct in his clarification of Mr. Kandt’s summary of the 
meeting. It’s not that the entire Board was reticent to take action, but Senator Ford expressed 
the greatest concern about the Board acting outside its statutory authority.  The Board was 
created in 1999 and the current implications of digital privacy and developments in technology 
were not yet envisioned.  
 
Mr. Elste observed that under NRS Chapter 205A setting forth the Board’s duties, duty #5 is to 
“Evaluate and recommend changes to existing civil and criminal laws relating to technological 
crimes in response to current and projected changes in technology and law enforcement 
techniques.” He argued that under that part of the statute, the Board is not acting outside of 
the bounds of its statutory authority.  
 
Mr. Kandt stated that as the Board’s Executive Director/General Counsel and by extension, 
the Subcommittee’s General Counsel, he had never voiced any concern regarding the topics 
the Subcommittee considered and the recommendations they made because he also 
interpreted the statutory scope in the broadest way possible. But there were Board members 
with that concern and that is why he wanted to look at creating a separate advisory board 
dedicated just to the issue of technological and digital privacy.  He suspected that there will be 
many legislators in addition to Assemblyman Bobzien who will be interested in it.  
 
Mr. Victor added that in the last few months the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted new 
rules of civil procedure related to electronic information.  They are using standards from the 
Sedona Conference which is a standards body that has created specific guidelines regarding 
information governance and privacy.  He noted that this Subcommittee is not swimming up 
against the stream.  It is the direction things are going and the Nevada Supreme Court’s action 
has acknowledged that.  
 
Mr. Bates stated that things are moving fast, technology outpaces the law.  There is an 
advantage to having people at this stage anticipate tech privacy issues and advise others.  
 
Mr. Berghel asked Mr. Kandt about the mechanics of how to formalize the BDR process to 
create the Technical Privacy Subcommittee into a statutorily defined advisory board.   
 
Mr. Kandt stated that he thought there were three things that would have to be flushed out in a 
bill:  
1) Who sits on the advisory board; 
2) How to define the scope of what the advisory board can study and make 
recommendations on; and 
3) How to pay for the advisory board. 
 
He advised the Subcommittee to send him any thoughts on the first two parts and he would 
share them with Assemblyman Bobzien. He has already given Mr. Bobzien a broad outline but 
did not address advisory board membership. Legislative attorneys will actually draft the bill.  
 
The Subcommittee discussed alternative avenues for creating a stand-alone advisory board 
such as finding an existing public body more properly aligned with the work of the 
Subcommittee or creation of a new advisory board by executive order of the Governor.  Mr. 
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options, but to please let him know if anyone talked to a legislator other than Mr. Bobzien 
about it since Mr. Bobzien was already working on a BDR.  It was noted that Mr. Bobzien’s bill 
may be the best option since statutorily defined boards are more difficult to get rid of.  Mr. 
Berghel stated that there are other legislators who are aware of, and supportive of, the work of 
the Subcommittee. It was suggested that the Subcommittee compile a list of interested 
legislators and share it with Assemblyman Bobzien so that he can rally support around it.  
 
Mr. Kandt stated he was also monitoring BDRs to identify any potential bill that may be of 
interest to the Board or this Subcommittee.  
 
Mr. Cobb asked if the recommendations of the Subcommittee were public information.  Since 
both the Board and the Subcommittee are open meetings, any information presented is public. 
 
5. Discussion and possible action on approval of May 30, 2014, meeting minutes.  
 
Mr. Bates stated that he had sent Mr. Kandt some revisions to his remarks. Mr. Cobb made a 
motion to approve the minutes with his corrections.  Mr. Bates seconded the motion. The 
minutes were unanimously approved.  
 
6. Discussion with representatives of Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Program Management Office regarding 
Nevada UAS Test Site Privacy Policy (available at http://www.nias-
uas.com/content/nevada-uas-test-site-privacy-policy). 
 
Don Cunningham, the Business Operations Manager for Nevada Institute for Autonomous 
Systems Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Program Management Office, was in attendance.  
Mr. Cunningham was one of the original proponents for a UAS test site and was part of the 
team who wrote the response to the FAA’s request for comment in the competition for Nevada 
to be designated as a test site.  Upon designation, Mr. Cunningham went to work as the 
Business Operations Manager. He is also a test coordinator and speaks on behalf of the 
program to various interested parties.   
 
Mr. Berghel stated that he had attended the first few UAS committee meetings when Ms. 
Laxalt chaired the committee.  He faced resistance when he suggested that they take the time 
to develop a privacy policy so that they could direct the development if it were funded. Since 
he had never seen a clearly articulated privacy policy, he asked Mr. Kandt to arrange for Mr. 
Cunningham’s appearance to talk about it.  
 
Mr. Cunningham explained that he wrote the privacy policy and that there are several people 
in his office that handle interface with the privacy issue, but his office does not have a Chief 
Privacy Officer.  He directed committee members to the website where the public can view the 
privacy policy (http://www.nias-uas.com/content/nevada-uas-test-site-privacy-policy).  Copies 
were provided for the Subcommittee members.  
 
Mr. Cunningham stated that the Test Site wants to get out in front, and try to solve some of the 
issues with privacy. He went over the highlights of the privacy policy. He said that 90% of the 
UAS missions will have no issues with privacy since they will be for research and development 
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